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Natural resources lawyers are creatures of their environment. As a re-
sult, the practice of natural resources law exhibits a strikingly regional
character. For example, in the ard West, natural resources practice typi-
cally involves water rights or mining issues.' In the Southwest, oil and
gas development consumes a significant amount of a practioner's time. 2
In the South, wetlands development is a particular concern, 3 while the
resources lawyer in the populous areas of the East, Middle West, and
California is likely to have clients with hazardous waste disposal con-
cerns. 4 Although natural resources practice in the Pacific Northwest can
involve all of these issues, the predominant regional resources conflicts
have centered around timber,5 fishing, 6 and water power. 7
Natural resources law, a relatively new area of legal practice and
study, 8 is only beginning to probe its historical roots. Yet, it is clear that
many of today's resource conflicts are legacies of the policies and pro-
grams of earlier eras. 9 This is particularly true in the Pacific Northwest.
Although historical perspective has illuminated Pacific Northwest legal
1. See generally F. TRELEASE, WATER RIGHTS (3d ed. 1980); C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 1980); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW (1981).
2. See generally C. MEYERS & H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW (1971).
3. See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 456-98 (1982); W. RODGERS,
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 399-409 (1977); Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404
Permit Program Enters Its Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 409 (1980).
4. See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note -3, at 585-638; F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECf"ON: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 5, 188-224 (1981); Andersen, The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 633; Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste
Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 ENVmL. L. 679 (1982).
5. See generally A Symposium on Federal Lands Forest Policy, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1978).
6. See Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous
Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11
ENVTL. L. 211 (1981); Landau, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific North-
west, 10 ENVTL. L. 413 (1980).
7. See generally remaining articles in this Symposium issue; Symposium on the Northwest Elec-
tric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 13 ENVrL. L. Nos. 3 & 4 (forthcoming, 1983); Foote,
Larsen & Maddox, Bonneville Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENVrL. L. 831
(1976); Hittle, Larson, Randall & Michie, Pacific Northwest Power Generation, Multi-Purpose Use
of the Columbia River, and Regional Energy Legislation: An Overview, 10 ENVTL. L. 235 (1980);
Luce & Kaseberg, The Bonneville Power Marketing Area Legislation: Is Regionalism in Electric
Power Planning Old Fashioned?, 45 OR. L. REV. 251 (1966).
8. See Getches, Preface: On Natural Resources As An Area of the Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 195
(1982); Biblowit, The Teaching of Natural Resources Law in Eastern Law Schools, 6 COLUM. J.
ENVrL. L. 139 (1980). For an earlier evaluation, see Tarlock, Current Trends in the Development of
an Environmental Curriculum, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 297 (1970).
9. An excellent example of how past policies shape future programs is supplied by state and
federal clean air legislation. See Huffman, Book Review, 9 ENVTL. L. 441 (1979) (reviewing J.
KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY (1977)).
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studies of the timber10 and fishery resources, II no legal analysis of North-
west hydroelectric policies from an historical perspective exists.
This is regrettable because the foremost natural resources issues con-
fronting the region in the 1980's will concern the generation and distribu-
tion of electricity, three-quarters of which is produced by streamflows. 12
Passage of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conserva-
tion Act at the decade's outset has precipitated at least as many new con-
flicts as it has resolved. 13 Without an understanding of how and why the
present hydroelectric system developed, some emerging issues are likely
to be incorrectly characterized as novel, and the lessons of the past may
go unheeded. This article aims to give today's decision makers an appre-
ciation of yesterday's policy choices and their legacy by supplying an
historical dimension to the Pacific Northwest's hydroelectric system.
Today's electric power system has six principal characteristics. First,
unlike systems in most other regions of the country, the Pacific North-
west's system is primarily grounded on water power, although during the
past decade most new generating facilities have been coal or nuclear
power plants.14 Second, the costs of electricity have escalated rapidly in
recent years, a direct result of the new higher cost thermal plants, 15 some
of which have been stillborn. 16 Third, although the Pacific Northwest
utility industry is remarkably diverse, the more than one hundred public
and private utilities that serve the region are interconnected physically by
a transmission grid and institutionally by the region's large-scale whole-
saler of electricity, the federal Bonneville Power Administration.' 7
Fourth, while the federal role in the generation and distribution of electric
10. See Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1978).
I1. See supra note 6.
12. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 6 (1980).
13. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94
Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (Supp. V 1981)). See H. Spigal, Trends in
Regional Power Act Litigation (June 5, 1982) (paper presented at University of Washington, Contin-
uing Legal Education Conference on the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review) (noting that 19 suits were filed in the first 18
months after the Act's passage).
14. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 72.
15. Seeid.at7l.
16. For example, two of five nuclear power plants planned by the Washington Public Power
Supply have been cancelled, another postponed, and the fate of a fourth remains uncertain. In fact, a
recent evaluation of 18 planned thermal plants (nuclear and coal) found that only 2 plants were likely
to be completed. See I NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT, No. I1, May 28, 1982, at 8.
17. See generally BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, THE ROLE OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMINISTRATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, INCLUDING ITS PARTICIPATION IN
THE HYDRO-THERMAL POWER PROGRAM (July 22, 1977) (Draft Environmental Impact Statement)
[hereinafter cited as DEIS].
Vol. 58:175, 1983
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energy has been and continues to be significant, 18 the key policy choices
of the future will be made by the states, most notably through the inter-
state Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Coun-
cil. 19 Fifth, the growth of the interconnected system has been influenced
to a considerable extent by a desire to attract and maintain an aluminum
reduction industry that is extremely electricity consumptive. 20 Sixth, the
principal source of electricity is federal reservoirs designed for multiple
purposes. Electric power policies thus have inevitable, though not always
widely perceived, spillover effects on other water uses and resources,
particularly the region's economically valuable anadromous fish runs. 21
These system characteristics evolved over nearly half a century of re-
gional electric power development, and some are inextricably related to
national policies and politics. In fact, this article illustrates that a number
of fundamental issues that have confronted every generation of hydroe-
lectric policy makers first arose in the Progressive Era. If recent events
have created strange bedfellows, 22 these marriages are more understand-
18. In addition to the Bonneville Power Administration, the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers (federal project developer and operator), the Bureau of Reclamation (federal project developer
and operator), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (nonfederal project licensor and regu-
lator) have important roles in the operation of the hydroelectric system. See Blumm, Fulfilling the
Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific Proof, Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the
Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ENvTL. L. 103, 152-56 (1982).
19. The Council was established under § 4 of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(Supp. V 1981)).
20. "In fiscal 1978, the six aluminum manufacturers of the Northwest purchased nearly 24 bil-
lion kilowatt-hours of electric power, more than a third of the output of the Federal Columbia River
Power System." K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 5. On the other hand, North-
west aluminum plants employ only 12,000, about one-half of one percent of the region's nonagricul-
tural work force. Even if all plants using aluminum are considered, total employment is only
123,000, about five percent of the region's nonagricultural work force. COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR
THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF' THE POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 271-72 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as BPA HISTORY].
21. One recent study estimates the economic cost of current hydropower operations on Columbia
Basin anadromous fish runs to be over $370 million annually; cumulative losses since 1960 to be $6.5
billion; and future losses predicted at $3.7 billion per decade unless system operations are altered. See
Economic Value of Salmon Losses Estimated, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 18 ANADROMOUS FISH
LAW MEMO, May 1982, at 9 (summarizing P. MEYER, FISH, ENERGY AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON FISHERIES VALUES LOST AND AT RISK (1982) (paper produced for the
Northwest Resource Information Center).
22. One such strange alliance was between two investor-owned utilities and the City of Portland,
which twice had unsuccessfully attempted to disenfranchise them, in a suit against Bonneville seek-
ing access to lower cost federal hydropower. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at
14. In another alliance, the region's aluminum companies have recently joined former opponents,
Forelaws on Board and the Coalition for Safe Power, in a suit against Oregon's Public Utility Com-
missioner and Portland General Electric. Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, No. 82-3257 (9th Cir. filed
May 10, 1982). The plaintiffs claim that a recent rate order will impermissibly allow the utility to
recover a portion of its $132 million loss stemming from the now-defunct Pebble Springs Nuclear
Project. McDonough, Former Foes Join Forces in Rate Case, The Oregonian, Jan. 5,1983, at 9.
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able with an historical perspective. Moreover, many issues that domi-
nated the electric power agenda of previous generations recur repeatedly.
This is perhaps best evidenced by the Ninth Circuit's recent interpretation
of the effect of the forty-five year old public preference policy on Bonne-
ville's new power sale contracts authorized by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Act. 23 By tracing the roots of regional hydroelectric policy
making, this article illuminates the forces that influenced the growth of
the system in the past and those that will shape its future.
Part I of the article sets the stage by examining the national forces in-
fluencing electric power development in the pre-New Deal era. Part II
focuses on the policies of the New Deal and their impact upon the birth of
the Pacific Northwest hydroelectric system. Part III considers the de-
veloping system during World War II and the postwar years, while part
IV evaluates the influence of the Eisenhower "partnership" years. Part V
describes the forces that led to the creation of Bonneville's Hydro-Ther-
mal Program in the late 1960's. Part VI assesses the demise of that pro-
gram in the 1970's; this collapse became a catalyst for the coalitions that
sought federal legislation to establish a new institutional framework to
govern the region's electric power future. Part VII analyzes some of the
major innovations of that legislation, the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, in light of the historical record.
Finally, Part VIII concludes with some observations about what the les-
sons of the past may have to say about that Act's implementation.
I. THE PRE-NEW DEAL ERA
Long before becoming the driving force behind the economic growth
of the Pacific Northwest, the federal role in water resources development
was widely recognized as a key to the settlement of the nation's western
frontier. 24 In fact, the motivation for the first national plan for river im-
provements and canals, developed by Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
in 1808, was a desire to facilitate settlement of the vast territory acquired
from France in the Louisiana Purchase. 25 When the Supreme Court set-
23. In Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), amended, 686
F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071),
the court ruled that the contracts Bonneville offered to its direct service industrial customers (mostly
aluminum companies) violated the public preference clause because they gave the industrial custom-
ers first priority in access to nonfirm power (i.e., power in excess of that which the system can
assuredly produce).
24. See, e.g., F. SMITH. THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION chs. 1-5 (1966).
25. B. HOLMES, A HISTORY OF WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS, 1800-1960, at 3 (1972) (U.S.
Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1233). The Gallatin Report argued for federal assistance for internal
roads and canals because of a dearth of private capital. Its national plan included a system of canals
along the Atlantic coast and roads to connect the coast with western rivers. F. SMITH. supra note 24.
Vol. 58:175, 1983
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tled the issue of the federal government's constitutional authority over
navigation in 1824,26 the question of the federal role in developing canals
and other water improvements became one of the great political contro-
versies of the pre-Civil War era. 27 After the. Civil War, Populist midwest-
ern farmers advocated water developments to supply them with an alter-
native to high-cost railroad transportation, 28 an antimonopoly sentiment
that would become a persistent theme when the Electric Age took shape at
the turn of the twentieth century.
A. The Progressive Era
If the Pacific Northwest and electric power "grew up together, "29 they
were raised on a diet of reformist zeal that characterized the Progressive
movement in American politics. 30 Progressives were heavily influenced
by the overcrowding, poverty, and crime accompanying a seven-fold in-
crease in the nation's urban population between 1860 and 1910.31 They
at 4. The report, revised by John C. Calhoun in 1819, was resisted by Madisonians who held a
limited view of the federal government in internal improvements. B. HOLMES, supra, at 3.
26. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), the Court voided a grant by the State of
New York of a steamboat monopoly between New York and New Jersey because it conflicted with a
federal licensing scheme. Chief Justice Marshall suggested that congressional power to regulate com-
merce extended to all activities with an interstate impact, however indirect. Id. at 69-70. This deci-
sion squarely placed navigation within the scope of the federal commerce power and rejected Madi-
son's interpretation of a very limited role for the federal government in promoting internal
improvements. See B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 3. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 321-22 (1978) (describing the Madisonian view of the Commerce Clause as one in which
"Congress would be expected to do very little in the field of commercial regulation, and the states
would be powerless to regulate interstate commerce even when Congress did nothing at all"). For a
recent (albeit different) application of Madisonian principles to natural resources development, see
Ball, Good Old American Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and Continental
Shelf, 12 ENvTL. L. 623, 629 (1982) (concept of shared powers as a paradigm for outer continental
shelf leasing).
27. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 38-40 (1955) (noting the important role of
internal transportation improvements in helping to transform the character of American agriculture,
between 1815 and 1860 from a collection of independent yeomen to a coalition of commercial entre-
preneurs); 2 S. MORISON, TIE OXFORD HISTORY OFTHE AMERICAN PEOPLE 223-26 (1965) (explaining
the importance of water transportation for shipping midwestem grain to eastern markets, and observ-
ing that in 1825 the governor of Georgia complained that wheat from central New York was sold
more cheaply in Savannah than wheat from central Georgia); BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 13-14
(describing the anti-public-works platforms of the Democratic Party in the pre-Civil War Era).
28. These sentiments were embodied in an 1874 update of the 1808 Gallatin Report by the Win-
dora Select Committee. Richard Hofstadter, however, downplayed the role of railroad rates in the
difficulties faced by the late nineteenth century farmer. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 58; see also
S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFIciNcY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVE-
MENT, 1890-1920, at 92 (1959) (noting a general decline in railroad rates from the Civil War until
1898).
29. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 12.
30. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27.
31. Id. at 174.
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found in government-sponsored natural resources conservation programs,
particularly water projects, 32 a means to preserve the rural, small town,
individualistic life that post-Civil War industrialism threatened with big
corporations, big cities, and big political machines. 33
Although the moral priniciples of Progressive conservationists lay in a
simpler America and its agrarian past, the means by which they sought to
reach these ends involved harnessing new forces in American life-sci-
ence, technology, and industrial management-to achieve efficient re-
source use. 34 This efficiency paradigm led Progressives to embrace pan-
els of nonpolitical experts to make decisions aimed at maximizing all
water uses according to a scientific plan. 35 Borrowing organizational
techniques from the corporate world and the disinterestedness of applied
science, the Progressives hoped to eliminate the waste and inefficiencies
they believed inherent in decentralized, parochial decisions made by con-
gressional "log rolling." 36 Thus, while Progressives viewed conserva-
tion programs as a vehicle to preserve the individualism of rural, small-
town America, their conservation program adopted many of the tech-
niques of the very forces of change they were designed to combat. 37
32. The Progressives' emphasis on water development is reflected in their definition of "conser-
vation": construction of reservoirs to conserve water for use during dry seasons. S. HAYS, supra note
28, at 5.
33. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 10:
These people [middleclass urban reformers and upperclass eastern urbanites whose interest in
conservation and the West grew out of an enthusiasm for outdoor life] viewed with alarm the
way in which post-Civil War industrialism had changed the American landscape and American
society. They were worried about the organization of industry into combinations, and of labor
into unions, because they felt that both threatened the independent, self-made man. They be-
lieved that city life had transformed politics from the intelligent democratic process of the early
days of the Republic to a crude power struggle, dominated by privileged wealth and the corrupt
political machines which controlled the votes of slum dwellers. Thus, programs involving both
conservation of natural resources and the promotion of farm communities and small towns had a
strong appeal for them.
See also R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 131-73 (attributing the Progressive impulse to a status
revolution that caused old community pillars, including the clergy and the legal profession, to lose
power and influence to a new economic elite).
34. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 265-71 (describing the reliance on efficiency, organization, and
scientific technicians to achieve agrarian ideals as seeking Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian
means).
35. J. PENICK. PROGRESSIVE POLmCS AND CONSERVATION: THE BALLINGER-PINCHOT AFFAIR
16-17 (1968) (concept of efficiency molded on corporate organization and disinterested professional-
ism).
36. Id. at II (describing Theodore Roosevelt's belief that the running of the government should
be divorced from politics and proceed according to sound business principles); id. at 188 (Progressive
assumption that science, sound business principles, and specialists, not politics and interest group
pressure, should determine natural resources development); see also S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 2-3
(technicians, not politicians, were to achieve resource efficiency).
37. J. PENICK, supra note 35, at 12-13 (admiration for efficiency and fear of declining opportu-
nity both central tenets of Progressive conservationists); see also S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 265-66
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The basic tenets of Progressive water policies exemplified this attempt
to preserve the equities of an older America by employing the efficiencies
of corporate management and sound business principles. The equity side
of Progressive thought manifested itself in assertions that streamflows
were part of the public domain and that their benefits should be widely
shared, not controlled by narrow monopoly interests. 38 The efficiency
side is reflected in the belief that multiple uses of streamflows should be
maximized through scientific, river basin-wide planning. 39 In pursuit of
both their equity and efficiency goals, Progressive conservationists
charted an active role for the federal government as planner, regulator,
and even developer of water projects. 40
The notion of the public nature of streamflows became a means to fore-
stall growing monopolization of the emerging electric power industry,
with its attendant high rates and poor customer service. 41 Theodore Roo-
sevelt, whose 1901 call for a federal program of water projects prompted
passage of the first Reclamation Act a year later, 42 vetoed legislation au-
(noting shared views of conservationists and corporations regarding the need for large-scale organiza-
tion, technology, and planning to eliminate uncertainties and waste of resources).
38. Progressives believed that waterways benefits were socially created and therefore should be
equitably shared. See Bates, Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement,
1907-1921, 54 MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HisT. REV. 29, 30-31 (1957). This notion that publicly created
components of the value of property should remain in the public domain led Judge Brietel of the New
York Court of Appeals to conclude that value attributable to "the social complex" was not compens-
able in a suit alleging that New York City's historic landmarks law unconstitutionally restricted de-
velopment rights. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Supreme Court, however, expressly
reserved judgment on this issue. 438 U.S. at 121 n.23.
39. The best publicized Progressive conservationist, Gifford Pinchot, stated that "every river is a
unit from its source to its mouth." Quoted in Bates, supra note 38, at 31. This basin-wide perspective
made local control appear inadequate. The emphasis on scientific planning led to a reliance on strong
leadership from the Executive. Id. at 42. For brief summaries of Progressive water conservation
policies, see B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 6; BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 13.
40. Justification for a large federal role included: (1) experience with irrigation projects indicated
that state and private financing was insufficient to fund large-scale projects; (2) the interstate charac-
ter of streams inhibited local development, particularly where, as in flood control, the principal bene-
ficiaries were far downstream; and (3) only the federal government, which controlled public lands
and navigable streams, could prevent land speculators from inhibiting comprehensive stream de-
velopment. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 101-02.
41. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 12; see also infra note 44. Concern over the effects of
water power monopolies was not a Progressive innovation. A preceding generation of jurists had
transformed American water law from traditional natural flow principles to the reasonable use theory
largely to prevent easy acquisition of prescriptive rights to streamflows by the first mill owner on the
stream. M. HOROwnrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1840, at 42-47 (1977). The
same antimonopoly sentiment that fueled the Progressive antitrust movement was evident in the early
19th century controversy over general incorporation statutes. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 171,405 (1973).
42. Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 36 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified in scattered sections of
43 U.S.C.). The Reclamation Act, often referred to as the Newlands Act after its chief sponsor,
Senator Newlands of Nevada, contained a number of innovative provisions. First, reclamation proj-
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thorizing private hydroelectric developments that did not specify limited
license terms and payment of annual charges. 43 This monopolization fear,
which also manifested itself in Progressive "trust busting" and rate regu-
lation reforms, was particularly acute in the electric power field, where by
1912 ten holding companies accumulated control of sixty percent of the
nation's commercial water power. 44
Not content simply to block water projects that did not promise suffi-
cient public returns, Roosevelt appointed a commission to survey pro-
spective waterway improvements and to recommend a suitable role for
the federal government. In 1908, the Inland Waterways Commission
45
ects were to be self-financed through use of a Reclamation Fund to which project beneficiaries were
to repay estimated construction costs in annual interest-free installments. Second, the Reclamation
Service was given an unprecedented delegation of authority to initiate project planning without con-
gressional approval, an attempt to replace "log rolling" with administrative expertise. Third. recla-
mation irrigation was, in theory, to be limited to owner-occupied tracts of 160 acres or less, another
manifestation of Progressive antimonopoly sentiment. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 12-14; B. HOLMES,
supra note 25, at 8. In practice, of course, the acreage limitation was riddled with loopholes, excep-
tions, and lack of federal enforcement. See, e.g., F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 740-44; G. COGGINS
& C. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 106-18. On October 12, 1982, President Reagan signed into law
significant amendments to the Reclamation Act that increase the acreage limitations to 960 acres and
eliminate interest-free repayments. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263 (1982) (codified in scattered
sections of43 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
43. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 17, 21-22. Roosevelt vetoed proposed private development
at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in 1903 because it failed to provide for sufficient return to
the public from power revenues. After signing 25 water development bills, the President issued two
other vetoes on the same grounds in 1907 and 1908. The latter vetoes involved a disagreement be-
tween Roosevelt, who believed that the 1906 Dam Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to attach
conditions aimed at securing a financial return to the government from a share of power revenues, and
the Corps and its congressional allies, who believed that the Corps' authority over private projects
extended only to conditions related to navigation. S. HAYS. supra note 28, at 114-17. Limited-term
permits and annual fees were first required in 1905 for water projects on national forest land by the
Forest Service, under the leadership of Progressive Gifford Pinchot. B. HOLMES. supra note 22, at 7.
44. BPA HISTORY, supra note 24, at 23 (relying on figures from the U.S. Bureau of Corpora-
tions). This represented a significant increase in consolidation; in 1909, the Bureau of Corporations
reported that one-third of the nation's commercial water power was controlled by 13 groups. Id. at
22. The Progressive antipathy to water power monopolies is illustrated by Robert La Follette's asser-
tion that, beginning in 1903, he secured in every water power franchise licensed by the State of
Wisconsin a provision that rates would be regulated through arbitration and profits limited to six
percent. R. LA FOLLETTE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 155 (1913).
45. The Inland Waterways Commission (IWC) should be viewed as the successor to earlier na-
tional water resources planning efforts in 1808, 1819, and 1874. See supra notes 24-25 and accom-
panying text and note 28. The IWC was the brainchild of W. J. McGee, former head of the Bureau of
Ethnology. McGee linked inland waterways users, who were frustrated at their inability to obtain
congressional approval for particular projects, with the Roosevelt Administration, which wanted ex-
ecutive control over future water developments. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 102-05. The congressio-
nal stumbling block was Theodore Burton, Chairman of the House Rivers and Harbors Committee.
who believed that inland waterway development was uneconomical and denied that waterway compe-
tition would have any effect on rising railroad freight rates. Id. at 93-94. Midwestern waterway
proponents particularly welcomed the IWC, which they viewed as a potential vehicle to obtain ap-
proval for a deep waterway from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 95-105. Conservation-
ists in the Administration, like Frederick Newell, Gifford Pinchot, and Interior Secretary James Gar-
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reported to the President, declaring water to be a public resource and rec-
ommending basin-wide federal water planning to serve multiple pur-
poses, including navigation, flood control, water power, irrigation, and
pollution control. 46 Over the dissent of the Army Corps of Engineers, 47
the Commission also recommended that a central, national water plan-
ning agency be established to coordinate the activities of the Corps, the
Bureau of Reclamation, and other federal agencies .48
Centralized, national water planning not only fit with the Progressive
notion of maximizing efficiency, it was also an attempt to reduce the in-
fluence of congressional "log rolling," by which individual legislators
exercised a disproportionate influence in securing congressional approval
of uneconomic, parochial projects. 49 These Progressive reforms, how-
field, viewed the IWC as a means to promote multiple-use projects and river-basin planning. Id. at
100-02.
46. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 21-22; B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 6. The report also
recommended coordinating waterway traffic with railroad traffic and equitably allocating national and
local costs and benefits. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 6. Adopting a suggestion of Marshall Leigh-
ton, Chief Hydrographer of the Geological Survey, the Commission recommended that government
sales of hydropower be used to finance multipurpose projects. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 107-08.
Theodore Roosevelt, who felt that Congress could not resist the political pressure to pursue many
unrelated projects at the same time, believed that centralized planning could maximize effective use
of limited funds. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 110-11.
47. The Corps' relationship with Progressive conservationists was an uneasy one. Where the
conservationists wanted nonpolitical panels of experts to make water development decisions based on
a paradigm of multiple use and coordinated river-basin development, the Corps was wedded to sin-
gle-use projects. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 108. First given responsibility to improve waterways for
navigation in 1824, B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 3-4, the Corps was extremely slow to recognize
nontransportation uses of waterway improvements. See S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 109. In fact,
beginning in the 1850's, the Corps denied that reservoirs could effectively control floods, preferring
to rely on a system of levees for flood control. See generally A. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER DISAS.
TERS: A CENTURY OF ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 252-302 (1971) (describing the
Corps' resistance to reservoir development as a means of flood control). The Corps also disputed the
Progressive notion that forests could retard runoff and therefore were an important element in control-
ling floods.
But while differences in hydrological theory seemed to be the basis of the Corps-Progressive split,
the Corps was wary of progressive innovations chiefly because it feared losing its preeminent role in
water development to other agencies. See S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 107-12, 200-05. A centralized
water planning agency, such as that proposed by the IWC, was viewed by the Corps as a direct threat
to its autonomy. In its efforts to resist the IWC recommendations, the Corps found congressional
allies who feared that a central committee of nonpolitical, scientific experts would upset local politi-
cal arrangements. See infra note 49. That the Corps' hostility to multiple-purpose planning was pri-
marily grounded on political, not hydrological, philosophy is evidenced by the fact that in 1913 it
supported a comprehensive investigation of water problems so long as the Corps, not an independent
commission, was assigned this responsibility. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 214-15.
48. See B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 6.
49. Conflicts between congressional and executive power over water resources predated the Pro-
gressive Era. The Corps of Engineers' self-conception as a mere technical advisor to Congress on
water projects limited its planning function, as an 1882 veto by President Arthur of allegedly "pork
barrel" projects illustrates. Two years later, Congress attempted to avoid future vetoes by requiring
that Corps surveys be preceded by a preliminary determination by the local district engineer that the
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ever, were stymied by shifting political sentiment and world develop-
ments. Bills implementing the Inland Waterways Commission recom-
mendations were blocked by congressional opponents, 50 and the Taft Ad-
ministration did not share its predecessor's enthusiasm for central
planning. 51 As a result, creation of a central water planning agency was
delayed until 1917,52 when legislation establishing a Waterways Com-
mission was enacted. 53 However, preoccupation with the war in Europe
and a dispute over the composition of the Commission membership pre-
river or harbor was "worthy of improvement." In 1902, Congress established a national-level Board
of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors to weed out uneconomic projects resulting from congressional
"log rolling." B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 3-4, 8. That same year the Reclamation Service was
given the unprecedented authority to plan projects without congressional approval. See supra note
42. The Roosevelt vetoes, see supra text accompanying note 43, the Pinchot permit innovations, see
supra note 43, and the Inland Waterways Commission recommendations, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 46-48, all were influenced heavily by a desire to remove authority from a parochial Con-
gress to an Executive with a broader, technical perspective that would develop long-range plans to
maximize efficiency through the multiple-use concept. On the other hand, congressional opponents
felt that the increased efficiency achieved by greater executive control was not worth the loss of local
influence over particular projects that would accompany centralized, expert planning. See S. HAYS,
supra note 28, at 271-76.
50. The sponsor of the implementing legislation was Senator Newlands, who felt that the success
of the 1902 Reclamation Act he championed was dependent on the ability of commissioners to select
projects independent of the congressional appropriation process. He believed that these independent
commissions should be free to spend money "just as a board of directors of a great constructive
corporation would do," 42 CONG. REC 391 (1907), another indication of the Progressive ambiva-
lence toward bigness. See supra text following note 33. Congressional opponents of central planning,
headed by Theodore Burton, succeeded in delaying serious consideration of the Newlands bill by
establishing a Congress-dominated commission to restudy water development. Authorized by the
1909 Rivers and Harbors Act, this commission's 1912 report chartered a more conservative course
than the IWC, generally reflecting Burton's views, see supra note 45, including the belief that rail-
road rates should be lowered by regulation, not by funding waterway developments. S. HAYS, supra
note 28, at 220.
51. Taft, who was department head of the Corps as Roosevelt's Secretary of War, shared the
Corps' antipathy toward the IWC's central planning recommendations. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at
108-10, 119.
52. James Penick argues that frustration over the inability to implement the IWC recommenda-
tions led conservationists like Gifford Pinchot to link the conservation movement with the antitrust
crusade in order to marshall broad-based public support for policies that until 1908 had been a con-
cem only to technical administrators and a few economic interests. Thus, the antimonopoly, special
interest rhetoric characteristic of the "conservation crusade" of 1908-09 , which precipitated the
battle between Pinchot and Taft's Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger, and ultimately contrib-
uted greatly to the Bull Moose campaign of 1912, was in large measure part of a conflict between
advocates of centralized planning and departmental autonomy. See J. PENICK, supra note 35, at 1-18.
181-96.
53. Act of Aug. 8, 1917, ch. 49, 40 Stat. 250, 269 (1917). See B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 7.
Senator Newlands finally succeeded in his attempts to establish the Waterways Commission by
threatening to block flood control legislation supported by Mississippi Valley Senators. The compro-
mise resulted in section 18 of the 1917 Flood Control Act, which authorized the Commission. S.
HAYS, supra note 28, at 238.
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vented any appointments. 54 When Congress culminated a fifteen-year
Progressive struggle to establish a uniform licensing scheme for non-
federal water project development 55 by passing the Federal Water Project
Act in 1920,56 opponents of federal development succeeded in including
in that legislation a provision that terminated the Waterways Commission
without transferring its functions to the new Federal Power Commis-
sion.57
In effect, the 1920 Act substituted federal regulation of nonfederal de-
velopments for the centralized water planning advocated by the Progres-
sives. It also rejected conservationist philosophy by providing only rela-
tively low federal charges and failing to earmark those revenues for
federal multiple-purpose projects. 58 Nevertheless, a number of Progres-
sive notions embodied in the Act became enduring principles of national
water policy, including a preference for publicly sponsored development,
limited-term licenses that reserved ultimate ownership in the public do-
main, and license criteria which, while not expressly incorporating the
multiple-use concept, were at least amenable to it. 59
54. Senator Newlands wanted the commissioners to be cabinet members, while the Corps and its
congressional allies wanted noncabinet officials who would be more responsive to Congress. S.
HAYS, supra note 28, at 208,238-39.
55. Since passage of the 1906 General Dam Act, nonfederal projects required Corps of Engi-
neers' approval, seemingly on the basis of multiple-use criteria. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 7.
However, the Corps of Engineers adopted a narrow view of its authority under this legislation, be-
lieving it was limited to navigation-related regulations, a view sustained by Taft's Attorney General,
George Wickersham. Although Wickersham's decision prompted enactment of new legislation in
1910, 36 Stat. 593, June 23, 1910, the Corps refused to interpret its authority to include imposing
federal charges on private water power projects, a Forest Service policy since 1905 (see supra note
43). S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 161-65.
Since Federal water power charges were viewed by conservationists like Pinchot as the key to
finance multiple-purpose developments, the Corps' reticence should be viewed as part of its struggle
to maintain its preeminent role in water development that included opposition to the multiple-use
concept. See supra notes 47 & 49. This attitude on the part of the Corps, of course, was welcomed by
utilities that did not want to pay such charges. Utilities also fought against comprehensive water
power licensing, arguing that it would intrude upon states' rights. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at
22. This concern with states' rights was short-lived; a quarter century later, utilities would success-
fully convince the Supreme Court that the Federal Power Act preeempted state water project licensing
schemes. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). I
have questioned the continuing vitality of this decision, at least to the extent that it precludes states
from affecting project operations. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 291-93. But see 40 Op. Att'y. Gen.
2, 5 (Or. 1979) (Oregon facility siting certifications for hydroelectric facilities preempted by Federal
Power Act).
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. B. HoLMEs, supra note 25, at 7. Senator Newlands' death in 1919 contributed greatly to the
termination of the Commission. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 239.
58. S. HAYs, supra note 28, at 239-40.
59. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1976) (public preference); 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1976)
(maximum of 50-year license terms); 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976) (best adapted to comprehensive
plans). Under § 800(b) of the Act, the Federal Power Commission was directed to deny licenses to
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B. The Twenties
The Republican ascendency in the 1920 election considerably altered
the federal role in water resources development. The Republicans re-
jected Progressive antimonopoly and income distribution concerns as un-
dermining prosperity. They also objected to federal competition with pri-
vate enterprise in hydroelectric development. 60 Consequently, in the
decade following the war, private power interests predominated. Multi-
ple-purpose, federal water planning made significant strides, however,
and the first multiple-purpose federal project was authorized in 1928.61
Thus, while the 1920's contained little of the Progressive zeal that linked
water development with democratic reform, the Republican years initi-
ated planning of many projects that the New Deal would later pursue. 62
A major reason for the dominance of private power was the Federal
Power Commission (FPC), created by the 1920 Federal Water Power
Act. 63 Although the FPC possessed broad regulatory powers, it was sup-
plied with little staff and funding and thus functioned largely as a clear-
inghouse, ensuring against duplication of project applications. 64 With
projects when it believed that federal development was more appropriate. This provision, along with
the requirement that projects be best adapted to comprehensive plans, enabled the Supreme Court to
overturn a license granted to the Pacific Northwest Power Company to construct the High Mountain
Sheep Dam on the Snake River in Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
Samuel Hays argues that the Federal Power Act represented a rejection of the multiple-use ideal of
Pinchot and Roosevelt because it authorized nonfederal power projects without attempting to maxi-
mize other uses such as flood control and irrigation. S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 240. Section 803(a).
however, at least presaged the comprehensive planning that the Corps was to undertake later in the
1920's. Moreover, I question whether Progressive rhetoric concerning "multiple use" can be
equated with the extensive federal water developments that characterized New Deal water policy.
Most Progressives held a much more limited view of the role of government, and the Federal Power
Act at least held out the possibility of achieving comprehensive waterway development through fed-
eral regulation. For an overview of the differences between Progressive and New Deal philosophy.
see R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 310-15 (alleging that, unlike the Progressives, who sought to
reestablish competition by attacking bigness, New Dealers stressed the need for government organi-
zation to protect consumers against monopolistic practices).
60. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 10.
61. Boulder Canyon Project Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 617-617t (1976 & Supp. 111979)).
62. Donald Swain argues that during the 1920's the conservation movement, previously domi-
nated by water storage projects and soil and timber management. broadened its agenda to include
wildlife conservation and aesthetic concerns. D. SWAIN. FEDERAL CONSERVATION POLICY,
1921-1933. at 6-7 (1963). Two landmark Supreme Court decisions helped to support this broadened
agenda: Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the constitutionality of federal regula-
tion of wildlife under the Migratory Treaty Act): and Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (upholding the constitutionality of municipal zoning).
63. Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
64. D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 113-14. The Federal Power Act (I) gave the FPC jurisdiction
over all water power sites on navigable streams; (2) limited private licenses to 50-year terms: (3)
authorized rate regulation and uniform cost accounting; (4) enabled the agency to limit excessive
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few regulatory requirements and nominal fees, private water power
boomed. 65
Although federal development was overshadowed by private projects,
the principal federal development agencies-the Corps of Engineers and
the Bureau of Reclamation-became advocates of multiple-purpose plan-
ning. The Corps, which staunchly resisted the Progressives' call for com-
prehensive basin-wide planning, 66 became a convert in 1927 when Con-
gress authorized the Corps to undertake multiple-use plans. 67 The
Bureau, which initiated construction of the first federal multiple-purpose
project when the Boulder Canyon project was authorized in 1928,68 saw
hydropower sales as a means to finance its irrigation projects. 69 In the late
profits by imposing fees; and (5) required that the developments be consistent with comprehensive
plans. Pub. L. No. 66-280, §§ 4, 6, 10, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). See supra note 59. Part of the reason
for the FPC's ineffectiveness was that its commissioners-the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior,
and War-had other, more pressing responsibilities. In 1930, Congress reorganized the Commission
into a five-member, independent, bipartisan commission after an investigation revealed its ineffec-
tiveness and its virtual capture by private power interests. See Investigation of Federal Regulation of
Power: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-65
(1930); D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 113-15.
65. "By 1931 FPC licensees had developed about 6 percent of the total electrical generating
capacity of the United States and were producing about 24 percent of all American hydroelectric
power." D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 115.
66. See supra note 47. The Corps' traditional navigation responsibilities were broadened to in-
clude flood control in the 1917 Flood Control Act, Pub. L. No. 64-367, § 1, 39 Stat. 948 (1917)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 643, 701-703 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), but the Corps' flood
control policy was to rely exclusively on levees, not reservoirs. D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 105.
67. Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 69-560, 44 Stat. 1010 (1927). This Act authorized the
Corps to pursue surveys of river basins that were identified in a joint Corps/Federal Power Commis-
sion study authorized two years before and printed in House Document 308. B. HOLMES, supra note
25, at 11; Blumm, supra note 6, at 224-25. The general investigatory nature of these surveys (re-
ferred to as "308 Reports") equipped the Corps with the discretion to initiate project planning similar
to that enjoyed by the Reclamation Service (now Bureau of Reclamation) since 1902. See supra note
42. Although it took more than twenty years for the Corps to complete these "308 Reports," they
provided the basis of most of the water project development of the New Deal and postwar eras. B.
HoLMEs, supra note 25, at 12. This is particularly true in the Columbia Basin. See Blumm, supra
note 6, at 225-43.
68. Boulder Canyon Project Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976 & Supp. 111979)). The Act was prompted by a 1922 Reclamation
Service report on Imperial Valley flooding. With the ratification of the 1922 Colorado River Treaty,
river flows were allocated between upper and lower basin states, resulting in constant congressional
pressure to dam the Colorado to provide flood control for the Valley and a municipal water supply for
burgeoning Los Angeles. Southern California Edison blocked the project for a time because it feared
public power competition, but when Senator Hiram Johnson softened the legislation's public power
provisions, President Hoover approved the project that would later bear his name. D. SWAIN, supra
note 62, at 89-91.
69. Financing problems plagued the Reclamation Fund, which under the 1902 Reclamation Act
was to be repaid construction costs by project beneficiaries in 10 years. Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 4, 32
Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). In 1914, Congress ex-
tended the repayment period to 20 years, Reclamation Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-170, § 1, 38 Stat.
686 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.), and in the 1920's passed a
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1920's, both agencies studied the feasibility of developing the Columbia
Basin, and the Bureau's Grand Coulee project was nearly approved by
President Hoover. 70 The Republican attachment to private power was
strong enough, however, to prevent federal construction until the New
Deal.
The most celebrated conflict between federal and private power de-
velopment in the 1920's occurred on the Tennessee River. During the
war, Congress authorized construction of a dam to supply power for a
government explosives plant at Muscle Shoals, a thirty-seven mile stretch
of the Tennessee River that dropped thirty-four feet. 71 For more than a
decade, Muscle Shoals development was in the spotlight of a public
versus private power development debate, as Presidents Coolidge and
Hoover vetoed bills authorizing federal development, and Progressive
Senator George Norris blocked attempts to sanction private develop-
ments. 72 This stalemate persisted until the New Deal made federal de-
velopment of the Tennessee Valley the centerpiece of its water resources
policy.
The Muscle Shoals fight was fueled by a flurry of utility mergers. In
1926 alone, there were more than 1000 mergers, most of which involved
sales of public utilities to private companies the stock of which was con-
number of leniency acts to further delay repayment. D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 79. With the Recla-
mation Fund insufficient to support new projects, the Bureau was interested in other means of financ-
ing. It should be noted that this legislation also removed the Bureau's authority to construct projects
without congressional approval, a stunning defeat for advocates of scientific planning and a victory
for local interests who disliked the bureaucrats' autonomy. Pub. L. No. 63-170, § 16, 38 Stat. 686:
D. SWAIN. supra note 62, at 76-78.
70. The idea of a high dam at Grand Coulee to irrigate the Columbia Basin's Inland Empire had
been seriously discussed since the end of the war. A plan to irrigate the eastern Washington and
Oregon deserts was endorsed by the 1920 Democratic platform. However, as in the case of the Boul-
der Canyon Act, private power interests opposed construction of a project that was to be financed out
of federal power sales. Instead, they backed construction of an irrigation canal between the Pend
Orielle River and the desert. In the mid-1920's, the Bureau felt the project was too expensive and
complex to pursue. However, when the Corps' "308 Report" on the Columbia River included the
Coulee Dam among the nine projects it recommended for construction, the Bureau had a change of
heart. By 1930, both the Bureau and the Corps advocated the project. When the Corps decided to
emphasize development of the lower river in 1932, the project became the Bureau's. President Hoo-
ver (who lent his support to the project as Secretary of Commerce in 1926) withheld approval of the
dam, however, favoring the Pend Oreille canal. Id. at 91-93.
71. National Defense Act, Pub. L. No. 64-85, § 124, 39 Stat. 166 (1916) (repealed 1956). BPA
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 24-25. Private development of Muscle Shoals was the object of a Theo-
dore Roosevelt veto in 1903. D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 116.
72. The highest private bid for the Muscle Shoals development was made by Henry Ford, who.
in addition to selling power, wanted to convert the explosives plant into a fertilizer plant. Ford never
offered to pay more than a small proportion of the federal government's sunk costs and wanted a 100-
year lease during which the plant would be exempt from Federal Power Commission regulation. B.
HOLMES, supra note 25, at 10. Senator Norris explained his opposition to Ford's plan in an article in
The Nation in 1923. See AMERICA'S ENERGY 56-57 (R. Engler ed. 1980).
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trolled by large holding companies. 73 Coupled with ineffective FPC regu-
lation, this increased industry concentration resulted in increased electric
rates and charges of excessive profits. Dissatisfaction with ineffective
utility regulation prompted a Federal Trade Commission investigation of
holding companies in 1928, 74 and led Senator Norris to advocate federal
power to serve as a "yardstick" for measuring rates. 75 The 1920's, how-
ever, were important not simply for shaping the New Deal reaction to the
excesses resulting from the marriage between private power and the Re-
publican party, 76 but also for formulating many of the multiple-use water
plans that became blueprints for New Deal projects. 77
H. THE NEW DEAL
The philosophical underpinnings of Pacific Northwest hydropower de-
velopment are found in the Progressive impulse, but the economic reali-
ties of the Great Depression transformed that philosophy into action. 78
The New Deal belief that the federal government could stimulate eco-
nomic recovery through public works projects was soon translated into
water project construction, for which the Corps' "308 plans" provided
handy blueprints. However, dam building was not simply a means of un-
employment relief; it was fundamentally related to the notion that inade-
quate regulation of private utilities led to inequities in the distribution of
electric power. New Dealers sought cheaper and wider distribution of
electric power both through federal regulation of private power and fed-
eral promotion of public power. The latter, of course, was one of the
motivations for the establishment of the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion. Federal regulation, however, particularly in its Brandeisian concern
for controlling holding company monopolies, 79 ultimately made possible
73. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 10-11.
74. The investigation was induced by a Senate resolution sponsored by Senator Thomas Walsh,
who was incensed by a 1927 Federal Trade Commission report of electric power monopolization that
he termed a "whitewash." See infra note 83. The ensuing investigation lasted six years and laid the
foundation for the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at
23-24. See Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 79-79z-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
75. D. SWAIN, supra note 62, at 119.
76. The strength of the power companies was deplored in a pair of articles appearing in The
Nation in 1928 and 1929. See AMERICAS ENERGY, supra note 72, at 59-65.
77. Plans were initiated during the Hoover Administration that eventually led to projects on the
Mississippi River, the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence Seaway, and in the Columbia Basin. B.
HOLMES, supra note 25, at 10.
78. The employment crisis that ushered in the New Deal made unprecedented presidential public
works powers politically possible, although, like the Progressives, New Dealers wanted water proj-
ects constructed according to comprehensive, basin-wide plans to eliminate "pork barrel" projects.
B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 13.
79. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who two decades before had argued for the atomiza-
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the reconciliation of public and private power that occurred in the Pacific
Northwest during and after the Second World War.
A. Regulation of Holding Companies
During the 1920's, electric energy consumption more than doubled.
80
The utility mergers that characterized the postwar years were, in part, an
effort to increase service capability while holding down construction of
plants necessary to provide reserve generating capacity. 8 ' However,
while interconnection produced greater efficiency, it also resulted in con-
siderable centralization of authority in the form of large holding compa-
nies. As noted above, 82 the dangers posed by this "power trust" led Con-
gress to order a Federal Trade Commission investigation during the late
1920's.83
When the New Deal seized the reins of government in 1933, it was
clear that the law had not kept up with the technological innovations and
growth of private power. Although private utilities were regulated by
tion of large economic interests in his 1913 polemic, Other People's Money and How the Bankers
Use It. had an important influence on much New Deal legislation. He sought federal control over
holding companies because he believed that concentrated economic power undermined economic
competition, resulting in inefficiency and political corruption. P. FUNIGIELLO, TOWARD A NATIONAL
POWER POLICY: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY, 1932-41. at 21. 42-43, 56.
256 (1973). Brandeis also advocated financing public works projects, especially water projects, from
increased corporate and inheritance taxes. B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION
93, 104-05, 389 (1982). For a critical review of the Murphy book, see Frank, Book Review, 32 J.
LEGAL ED. 423 (1982).
80. National electric consumption, which had been 10 billion kilowatt hours (kwh) in 1910 and
31 billion kwh in 1920, mushroomed to 76 billion kwh by 1929. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at xiv
n.5.
81. Utility mergers also promoted access to financial markets and managerial and engineering
talent. Id. at xiv.
82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
83. The FTC was originally directed to investigate possible antitrust violations in the electric
power industry by a joint congressional resolution in 1925. S.J. Res. 329, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1925). The agency's 1927 report could find "no conclusive evidence" of the existence of a "power
trust" and asserted that power company consolidation was necessary in particular locations to raise
capital, reduce fixed costs, and increase returns. The FTC's conclusion that dismantling power com-
panies would result in excessive competition, inefficiency, and higher rates incensed reformers like
Montana's Senator Thomas Walsh, who sought another investigation by an independent committee.
See supra note 74. However, opposition from utilities and the investment banking community, who
were fearful that such an investigation would lead to federal regulation of the industry, initially
blocked the investigation. A compromise proposed by Senator Walter George of Georgia, transfer-
ring the investigation back to the FTC, enabled the resolution to pass. But it was an amendment of
Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, providing for public involvement in the investigation, along with a
change in FTC personnel, that ensured that the new investigation would not be another whitewash. P.
FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 6-20. The FTC's report, hurriedly released during the debate over the
Public Utility Act of 1935, called for federal regulation of interstate holding companies to ensure
adequate customer service and fair prices. Id. at 28, 58.
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state public utility commissions, their parent holding companies were
not.84 As a result, reformers called upon the federal government to break
up power monopolies by eliminating large holding companies. These ar-
guments found receptive ears in the White House, for FDR believed that
the centralization of wealth and power in the electric industry amounted
to "private socialism," resulting in unwarranted corporate control over
other people's money. 85 The ensuing Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 193586 imposed federal regulation on interstate holding compa-
nies, forbade increased economic concentration in the industry, and im-
posed a "death sentence" on the largest holding companies. 87 By
strengthening federal regulation over the electric power industry, the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 193588 caused private utilities to be-
come more concerned about the quality of their customer service, a con-
cern that would ultimately enable many -Pacific Northwest utilities to
resist the public power movement.
B. The Public Power Crusade
There was, of course, another means of responding to the high rates,
84. In 1927 the Supreme Court held that interstate holding companies could not be regulated as
public utilities by state commissions. Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam and Elec. Co.,
273 U.S. 83 (1927). For analyses of public utility regulation by an important New Deal figure, see
Lilienthal, The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 404 (1929);
Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression, 46 HARV. L. REv. 745 (1933).
85. FDR believed that because of their size, large corporations could not know the detail of their
own operations, which would lead to inefficiency. Like Brandeis, he felt that the worst evil of electric
holding companies was the centralization of wealth and power in the hands of a few. Calling for a
breakup of electric holding companies in his message transmitting the National Power Policy Com-
mission report on the proposed 1935 Holding Company Act, the President condemned the holding
company in Brandeisian terms, terming it "a corporate invention which can give a few corporate
insiders unwarranted and intolerable powers over other people's money." Report of the National
Power Policy Committee on Utility Holding Companies, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 2316 (1935). FDR
shared the Justice's view that dispersion of power would promote economic independence of local
companies, resulting in improved service for consumers. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 69-73.
86. Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976)).
87. Section I 1 of the 1935 Act mandated compulsory dissolution of large holding companies
after 1940, except where necessary to comply with state laws or to maintain efficient service. 15
U.S.C. § 79k (1976). The Act also prohibited increased economic concentration in the industry,
although a provision suggested by Felix Frankfurter authorized the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to approve exceptions where necessary to achieve the goals of local management, efficient oper-
ation, or effective regulation. By 1941, dissolution proceedings were pending against 14 of the larg-
est electric holding companies. P. FUNIGIELLO. supra note 79, at 80, 93-97, 261-62.
88. The holding company legislation passed along with amendments to the Federal Power Act,
which substantially expanded the power of the Federal Power Commission, giving the Commission
authority over accounting and pricing practices of electric utilities. See Federal Water Power Act of
1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, amended by Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 863 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1976)). See generally Federal Power Commission
Special Issue, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1945).
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unreliable service, and failure to serve rural areas that characterized the
private utility boom of the 1920's: the government could construct and
operate generating resources.
Fusing the Progressive notion of public control over waterways with
the belief that the federal government could and should stimulate eco-
nomic recovery through fiscal policy, the New Deal ushered in an era of
unprecedented federal water project development. The most spectacular
victory for public power interests occurred at Muscle Shoals, where Sena-
tor Norris' decade-long fight against private power development culmi-
nated in the enactment of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act in 1933. 89
In fact, the election of Franklin Roosevelt promised a new public
power era. 90 One month before the election, Roosevelt told 8000 cheer-
ing public power supporters in Portland, Oregon that, if elected, he would
pursue a nine-point power program that included government ownership
where necessary to secure lower electric rates. 91 Some partisans viewed
the New Deal victory as the beginning of an era in which public power
would replace private power. In retrospect, however, FDR's campaign
promise of federal water development indicated a more limited objective:
public power would serve as a "yardstick" by which to measure private
utility rates. 92
Although Pacific Northwest public utility districts made gains in every
election between 1930 and 1936, 93 they were never able to create a com-
prehensive federal agency with powers similar to those of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. It is true that the public preference clause in the 1937
89. Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). The Act, passed in April 1933, was upheld against private utility allegations of
unconstitutionality two years later. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (TVA dam construc-
tion was a valid exercise of commerce clause and war power authority of Congress).
90. While governor of New York, FDR supported legislation authorizing state ownership of hy-
droelectric projects that he eventually signed in 1931, creating the New York Power Authority. See
BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 20.
91. The Portland speech illustrated Roosevelt's pragmatism. He did not call for nationalizing
private power companies that some public power advocates saw as the first step toward national
economic planning. Instead, he endorsed government ownership to supply a "yardstick" by which to
measure private utility rates and to promote widespread use of electricity, particularly in rural areas.
P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 30-31,257-59.
92. FDR repeated his pledge after his election in a November 1934 speech at Tupelo, Missis-
sippi, where he called for "little TVA's" in other areas of the country. Id. at 51-52. Three years later
he again called for a series of regional conservation authorities that would consist of eight major
planning units and three "planning and management" units in the Tennessee, Mississippi, and Co-
lumbia River Basins. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 22.
93. By 1940 Washington voters had created 29 public utility districts, 15 in the 1936 election
alone. Oregon voters created four peoples' utility districts. The rural nature of the public power
movement is evidenced by the fact that, despite these elections, in 1940 80% of the region's popula-
tion was served by private utilities. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 50-52.
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Bonneville Project Act94 and BPA's emphasis on constructing transmis-
sion lines to serve rural areas benefitted public power for years. 95 But in
reality the Pacific Northwest public power movement crested shortly after
1937 for a variety of reasons. First, prompted by the 1935 Public Utility
Holding Company Act, the private utility industry began to provide better
service. 96 Second, private utilities began to invest some of their profits in
public relations and, in particular, in election campaigns, with increasing
success. 97 Third, public power meant bureaucracies, often federally con-
trolled. 98 Running against increased centralization of authority, private
power won a convincing victory in the elections of 1940 and 1941.99 Fi-
nally, the war years that followed deflected attention away from the dif-
ferences between public and private power and began an emphasis on
interconnection to assist in the war effort.100 When the war ended, the
fervor for public power could not be revived, although there were some
isolated public takeovers, notably in Seattle. 101
C. The Struggle Over Centralized Planning
The New Deal's emphasis on water projects 102 as the linchpin of its
regional economic development plans revived the old Progressive notion
that one executive agency should coordinate all water developments. 103
Although lack of a national power policy was recognized as a principal
reason for the electric shortages experienced during World War 1, 104 only
94, Ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-8321(1976 and Supp. V 1981)).
For a history of public preference under a number of federal power marketing acts, see Comment,
The Meaning of the Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under the Reclamation
Statutes, 9 ENvTL. L. 601 (1979). Cf. E. Redman, Preference and Other Clauses in Federal Power
Marketing Acts (unpublished manuscript, to be published in 13 ENvTL. L. (1983)).
95. See generally BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 111-17, 137-48.
96. Philip Funigiello notes that by 1941, utility operating ratios were lower and new investment
was under control. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 266.
97. Wendell Wilkie, of the Commonwealth and Southern Holding Co., asserted that private utili-
ties helped to propel the public power movement by neglecting public relations. Id. at 265-66. Be-
tween 1935 and 1940, more than $1 million was spent by private utilities to fight public utility elec-
tions, including establishing front organizations like "Let the People Vote League." BPA HISTORY,
supra note 20, at 98-100.
98. P. FuNiaGtiLLo, supra note 79, at 220-21.
99. Id. at 267-68.
100. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
101. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 101. Seattle City Light's acquisition of Puget Sound Power
and Light facilities in 1951 was the largest public takeover in Pacific Northwest history. Id. at 76.
102. Forty percent of the President's requested 1939 public works budget was for water projects.
B. HoLMES, supra note 25, at 19.
103. See supra note 47.
104. In 1921, Colonel Charles Keller of the Corps of Engineers released a report that attributed
deficiencies in the national defense power program to a lack of comprehensive federal policy. To
remedy this, Keller urged interconnection through a unified power grid and an expansion of generat-
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tentative steps toward agency coordination were taken during the postwar
years. 105 Thus, at the dawn of the New Deal, water resources planning
was still largely controlled by individual congressmen, particularly those
on the Public Works and Appropriations Committees. 106
In the name of effectively confronting the national economic crisis, the
New Deal included measures aimed at providing a much larger role for
the Executive Branch in water development. In the first few months of
1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the National Industrial Recov-
ery Acts gave unprecedented public works planning authority to the Exec-
utive. 107 A year later FDR established the National Power Policy Com-
mittee, an interagency committee charged by the President with
developing a unified national power policy. The Committee, chaired by
Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, played an important role in the drafting
of the 1935 Holding Company Act. 108 It did not, however, function as a
central planning agency or lay the groundwork for its successors to do
so.1 09 This failure was largely due to the steadfast opposition of the Corps
of Engineers, long a foe of central planning entities that might jeopardize
its close relationship with Congress. 110 In fact, the Corps not only helped
ing capacity. Another 1921 report by W.S. Murray, a New York consulting engineer, also urged
national planning to increase efficiency. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 226-28.
105. One such tentative step was the Corps' issuance of its first -308 Reports" during the
1920's. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. In addition, the Employment Stabilization Act of
1931, ch. 117, §8(b), 46 Stat. 1984, 1087, required all federal agencies to prepare six-year advance
programs of authorized public works projects. These six-year plans became a chief element of water
resources development for years. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 12, 19.
106. Id. at 21, 31-32. The independence of the Bureau of Reclamation was curtailed in 1914.
See supra note 69. Committee resolutions, which could not be vetoed and avoided the tortuous pro-
cess of passing a bill, were relied on by the Corps as an important means of congressional authoriza-
tion.
107. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); National Industrial Recovery Act.
Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1931). Under Title II of the NIRA, $3.3 billion was appropriated
for the planning and construction of public works projects. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 15. Many of
the projects begun under Title II authority were later declared to be unauthorized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 186-92 (1935).
108. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976)). See P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 38-66.
109. P. FUNttIELLO, supra note 79, at 39, 261. The National Planning Board, created in 1933,
was followed by the National Resources Board in 1934, the Natural Resources Committee in 1935.
and the Natural Resources Planning Board in 1939. Beatrice Holmes considered these agencies to be
functionally identical. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 14-15. They all suffered from a lack of statutory
basis, no jurisdictional definition, and waning presidential interest in central planning as the nation
seemed headed for economic recovery. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 259.
110. Corps opposition helped defeat legislation that would have created a permanent Natural
Resources Board in 1935 and 1936, forcing FDR to continue central water planning functions by
Executive Order. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 16, 22. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, the Roose-
velt Cabinet's chief proponent of central economic planning, summed up his feelings about the Corps
in a foreword to Arthur Maass' MUDDY WATERS (1951): "No more lawless or irresponsible Federal
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to block New Deal efforts to establish a central water planning agency, it
managed to augment its own water resource responsibilities, having fi-
nally embraced the multiple-use concept. "'1
Although coordinated water planning nominally remained a New Deal
goal until 1943,112 a central planning agency was not a realistic possibil-
ity after 1939.113 Thus, while multiple water use planning became widely
accepted 1 4 and several important reforms were instituted during the New
Deal,115 a national water planning agency remained an elusive ideal. In
retrospect, this failure is attributed not simply to the Corps and its con-
gressional allies who feared losing influence over public works; it also
was a reflection of the fact that, fundamentally, New Dealers were more
group than the Corps of Army Engineers has ever attempted to operate in the United States, either
outside of or within the law." Id. at xiv.
11. In 1935, Congress directed the Corps to supplement its "308 Reports" to take into account
economic changes and additional streamfiow data, thus effectively supplying the Corps with continu-
ing authority to undertake nationwide river-basin planning. A year later, Congress gave substantial
flood control responsibilities to the Corps in the Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, §§
1-19,49 Stat. 1570-96 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 701a-701f, 701h (1976)). And in 1938
the Corps was authorized to install power facilities at flood control projects on the basis of recommen-
dations by the Chief of Engineers and the Federal Power Commission. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at
16.
Perhaps one reason the Corps readily accepted new flood control responsibilities is that, like navi-
gation benefits, no local cost-sharing is required for flood control benefits. B. HOLMES, supra, at 20.
112. The last hope for a central water planning agency died in 1943 when Congress refused to
appropriate funds for the Natural Resources Planning Board and expressly directed that its functions
not be transferred to another agency. Such transfers were a frequent New Deal practice. See, e.g.,
supra note 109. Encouraged by the Corps and conservatives who were alarmed by other experiments
with central planning, such as social security and fiscal policy, Congress terminated funding despite a
plea from FDR that the Board was necessary for post-war planning. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 22.
113. In the 1939 Reorganization Act, Congress required that any future presidential reorganiza-
tion plans be submitted to it, reserved the right to reject such plans by joint congressional resolution,
and expressly stipulated that the plans not transfer any Corps' functions. Reorganization Act of 1939,
Pub. L. No. 76-16, §§ 3, 4, 5, 53 Stat. 561, 561-63 (1936). See also B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at
22 (describing this and other reorganization attempts).
114. For example, the 1939 Reclamation Act sanctioned partial repayment of reclamation proj-
ects from power revenues, encouraging the Bureau to advocate multiple purchase projects. Reclama-
tion Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9, 53 Stat. 1187, 1197-96 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
43 U.S.C.). See supra note 111 (the Corps and multiple use). See also B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at
21,35.
115. Although a centralized water planning agency could not gain congressional support, the
1936 Flood Control Act managed to impose some control over congressional "log rolling" by requir-
ing that projects satisfy a cost-benefit test, a threshold that before long all federal water projects
would have to hurdle. Flood Control Act of 1937, 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976). The cost-benefit test has
proved to be an enduring source of controversy because of disagreements over how to compute bene-
fits. See, e.g., Jaffe, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective Evaluation of Federal Water Proj-
ects, 4 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 58 (1980). In addition, the 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act
instituted federal oversight of accounting and pricing practices of utilities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6
(1976 and Supp. V 1981). And, of course, a number of federal "yardsticks" were created, notably
BPA and TVA, the latter the only federal agency empowered to exercise all development and man-
agement functions within a particular geographic area.
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concerned with providing cheap electricity for the consumer than with
pursuing waterways development according to a scientific plan drafted by
experts in Washington, D.C. Cheap electricity, whether from public proj-
ects or private utilities, was the foremost New Deal goal. 116 Centralized
water planning was, therefore, a concept easily compromised by the
pragmatic Roosevelt in pursuit of this goal.
D. The Bonneville Project Act
In the Pacific Northwest New Deal water planning proceeded quickly
because the first of the Corps' "308 Reports" on the Columbia River and
its tributaries was completed in 1931.117 The report called for a series of
ten dams on the main-stem Columbia, including what were to become the
Bonneville and Grand Coulee projects. Construction began on both proj-
ects in 1933. After the Supreme Court ruled in 1935 that the projects had
not been authorized by Congress, Congress quickly reauthorized both
projects in the same year, and construction continued."18 As the Bonne-
ville project drew near to completion, distribution of the surplus power
produced by the dam became the subject of debate both in the region and
in Washington, D.C.
Between 1935 and 1937, thirty-eight bills were introduced in Congress
regarding the marketing of power from Bonneville Dam. 119 The most cru-
cial issues in this debate over the legislation were: (1) which agency
should have responsibility for project operations and power marketing;
(2) what the scope of federal responsibilities regarding construction of
transmission lines should be; and (3) whether power should be sold at
uniform rates irrespective of geographic distance from the project. Public
power advocates generally wanted establishment of a regional Columbia
Valley Authority, with comprehensive powers similar to those possessed
by the TVA. This authority would promote public power and widespread
use by constructing transmission lines throughout the region, delivering
116. See P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 260, 268 (cheap electricity for the consumer was the
unifying theme of the New Deal power policy; centralized water planning was inconsistent with
breaking up large holding companies and with the "grassroots" administration adopted by TVA); S.
HAYS, supra note 28, at 241, 248-49 (comprehensive planning failed because many, especially
Westerners, feared that executive agency planning would exclude them from influence; "scientific
management" effectively meant a bureaucrat who was unaffected by local politics); B. HOLMES,
supra note 25, at 23 (multiple-use reservoirs were threatening to local utilities and sometimes farm-
ers, rural real estate interests, and sportsmen).
117. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 225.
118. Both projects were funded under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and later
required reauthorization after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S.
174, 186-92 (1935). See supra note 107.
119. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 35-36.
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power at a uniform rate, and giving preference to publicly owned utili-
ties. 120
Private power interests, on the other hand, argued for a more limited
federal role. They favored project operation and power sales by the
Corps, limited federal construction of transmission lines, and rates that
reflected the cost of power transmission. 121 Allied with the private power
companies were economic interests in Portland, which wished to maxi-
mize their proximity to Bonneville, and the Corps, which of course
wanted as broad a charter as possible. 122 The debate over the Bonneville
legislation thus invoked urban/rural conflicts, private/public power com-
petition, and intergovernmental power struggles.
These conflicts prevented passage of the bill in 1936, but a compromise
was reached the following year. This compromise preserved the Corps'
role as project operator but authorized a Bonneville Project Administrator
to market power, construct transmission lines, and set rates. 123 Although
the legislation did not establish the TVA-like agency that private power
120. A bill establishing a CVA was introduced by Idaho's James Pope in the Senate and by
Washington's Knute Hill in the House. S. 689, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. 2790, 74th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1935); see BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, for background history of the bills. Many
CVA advocates wanted a new agency because they believed the Corps was too susceptible to pressure
from private power companies. P. FuNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 179. On the cozy relationship be-
tween the Portland District Engineer and local economic interests, see E. MACCOLL, THE GROWTH OF
A CITY: POWER AND POLITICS IN PORTLAND. OREGON, 1915 TO 1950, at 556, 698 n.3 (1979).
121. Cost of service pricing and few federal lines would maximize the locational advantage of
private utilities in Oregon. By reducing their rates, these utilities hoped to keep a lid on the proliferat-
ing public power movement. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 79-80.
122. Republican Governor Charles Martin and Senator Charles MeNary of Oregon wanted low
rates to attract industry to the Columbia Gorge. They believed that, without industrial sales, the
project would not be able to pay for itself. P. FuNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 175, 188-89, 201-02.
Both the Portland Chamber of Commerce and the Portland Corps District Engineer opposed uniform,
"postage stamp" rates because uniformity would increase electric rates in Portland. Id. at 177-80.
The Corps wanted limited federal involvement in transmission line construction, preferring "busbar
sales" to industry at the damsite. Id. at 188. Given the role of project operator, the Corps was more
willing to accept the legislation than its industrial and private power allies. Id. at 186, 190.
123. Congress adjourned for the 1936 elections before passing the Bonneville Project Act. How-
ever, the committees working on the legislation favored vesting power-marketing responsibilities
with the Corps. After the New Deal landslide and widespread public power successes in the election,
see supra note 93, FDR asked the Committee on National Power Policy to issue a report on the
legislation. The Committee was chaired by the Corps' longtime opponent, Secretary Ickes. See supra
note 110. Not suprisingly, the Committee opposed the Corps as the power-marketing authority, fa-
voring instead a new bureau within Ickes' department. It also recommended that power be marketed
at uniform rates to promote widespread use and that a preference be given to public utilities. See P.
FuNIGIEuLo. supra note 79, at 176, 181-84.
Washington Senator Homer Bone suggested a compromise in which a new agency would be given
power marketing authority, with the Corps responsible for day-to-day operations. More concerned
about maintaining a continuing role for itself than with protecting its private power allies from a new
public power oriented agency, the Corps accepted the Bone compromise. Id. at 190-91. See gener-
ally BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 55-62 (brief history of the legislation).
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interests feared, its directives to give priority to public power and to foster
"widespread use" gave public power advocates much of what they
sought. 124 Whether rates should be uniform was left to the discretion of
the new Administrator. 125 Discretionary power over such a vital issue,
combined With the broad delegation of authority to the Administrator
throughout the statute, made the selection of the first Administrator a very
important appointment. 126
E. "Postage Stamp" Rates and Rural Electrification
When FDR dedicated the Bonneville Dam in September of 1937, he
was met with numerous placards proclaiming "we want Ross" for
Bonneville Administrator. J.D. Ross, formerly with Seattle City Light
and then a Commissioner with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
was the choice of public power advocates who believed he would pro-
mote uniform, "postage stamp" rates and rural electrification. 127 Op-
posed to Ross were private utilities, the Portland Chamber of Commerce,
and Oregon Republican Governor Charles Martin, for whom uniform
rates meant higher rates to pay for electrification of rural areas and a con-
sequent loss of Portland's locational advantage.128 Ross, of course, got
the job and in 1938 proceeded to institute a uniform rate of two mills per
kilowatt hour, a rate that survived for twenty-seven years. 129
124. Bonneville Project Act of 1937, ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-8321
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Section 4(a) of the Act gave preference and priority to public power and §
2(b) provided for widespread use to prevent monopolization. Section 2(b) also anticipated connecting
the Bonneville project with other federal projects, foreshadowing BPA control over Grand Coulee-
produced power.
125. Bonneville Project Act of 1937, ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-8321
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Section 6 of the Act authorized, but did not mandate, uniform rates "in
order to extend the benefits of an integrated transmission system and encourage the equitable distribu-
tion of electric energy." The same provision gave the Federal Power Commission a veto authority
over BPA's rates.
126. See P. FUNOIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 194.
127. Id.
128. Governor Martin, the Chamber of Commerce, and private utilities opposed Ross who had
served as an unofficial lobbyist for the Washington Public Ownership League. They feared his com-
mitment to uniform rates would lead to increased costs, undermining advantages that Portland could
offer new industries. Commercial and private power interests around Portland were more than a little
envious of Seattle's industrialization and were suspicious of Ross' Seattle background. Ross, who
sought to decentralize population through uniform rates, was supported by public power interests.
labor, and the granges. Id. at 189-91, 194-95. For a recent remembrance, see Barich, Our Far-
Flung Correspondents: J.D. Ross's Vision, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 4, 1982, at 57.
129. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 86. Two mills meant a rate of $17.50 per kilowatt-year
(kwy). A slightly lower rate of $14.50 per kwy was authorized for customers within 15 miles of the
dam who provided their own transmission. Uniform rates were designed to encourage dispersion of




Although head of Bonneville for less than a year and a half, Ross left a
substantial legacy. In addition to establishing a uniform rate of two mills,
he placed a heavy emphasis on construction of transmission lines, 130 ac-
tively encouraged formation of public utility districts, 13' and indicated a
preference for selling power to industries that employed large num-
bers. 132 After his unexpected death in March of 1939, his successor, Paul
Raver (who was to serve as Administrator for nearly fifteen years), pur-
sued Ross' notion of social planning by signing industrial power con-
tracts, 133 although he backed away from openly advocating public
power. 134
By the time Pearl Harbor thrust the nation into war, Bonneville's tem-
porary status had been made permanent, 135 and the agency successfully
demonstrated that low electric rates would induce increased consump-
tion. 136 By constructing a high-voltage line between Bonneville and
Grand Coulee Dams, BPA laid the cornerstone of what would become a
130. The emphasis on transmission line construction is illustrated by BPA's "bricks and mortar"
budgets. For example, in fiscal year 1939, the agency had a $3.5 million construction budget, and
only $165,000 for administration; in fiscal year 1940, the construction budget was $14.4 million for
construction, $400,000 for operations. Id. at 112, 116.
131. Ross particularly encouraged the formation of public utility districts that would acquire Pu-
get Sound Power and Light. P. FuNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 204.
132. Id. at 197-98. Industrial power sales were signalled when a provision similar to that in the
TVA Act declaring industrial power sales to be a secondary purpose was deleted from the Bonneville
Act. This deletion, along with the concern for protecting the scenic values of the Columbia Gorge, is
evidence that advocates viewed water power development in the Pacific Northwest as a way to
achieve industrialization without pollution. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 129-30. Although
Ross indicated that he would reserve 20% of Bonneville power for industrial sales, he discouraged
aluminum companies because they employed relatively few workers. Id. at 129-33. On the employ-
ment generated by the region's aluminum industry, see supra note 20.
133. In 1939, rather than sign one large power sale contract with Alcoa, Raver insisted that
smaller plants be constructed at geographically dispersed locations in the name of regional equity and
antimonopoly. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 133. It should be noted that the Justice Department
initiated antitrust litigation against Alcoa in 1937, culiminating in a 1945 decision in which Judge
Learned Hand ruled that Alcoa was a monopoly. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945). See W. RODGERS, CORPORATE COUNTRY 162-63 (1973) (noting that after World War II,
the federal government disposed of its defense plants in a way that assisted Alcoa's competitors,
Reynolds and Kaiser, and that since the war, the three competitors "have learned to live together,
working through international consortiums, joint ventures and sometimes plain old conspiracies").
134. * Raver insisted on remaining neutral in the 1940 public utility district elections, perhaps
contributing to the convincing defeat that public power suffered that year. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note
79, at 219-20.
135. In January 1940, the Secretary of the Interior renamed the Bonneville project as the Bonne-
ville Power Administration. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 68. Later that year, BPA was directed
to market power produced from Grand Coulee Dam. Exec. Order No. 8526, 5 Fed. Reg. 3390-91
(1940).
136. P. FuNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 264-65. The price elasticity of demand, however, re-




region-wide, integrated grid. 137 Moreover, in order to finance its trans-
mission line construction, Bonneville was compelled to lure to the region
industries that were power dependent. 138
III. THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
If the New Deal looked upon federally produced, cheap power and re-
gional planning as a means to promote economic revitalization and rural
electrification and to combat the evils of economic monopolies, the war
years then thrust power policy into the forefront of the defense effort. In
the Pacific Northwest, the pre-war antimonopoly concerns that had fueled
the often bitter public-versus-private power struggles took a back seat to
efforts to mobilize the region behind the war effort. Founded as an agency
to promote public power, the Bonneville Power Administration evolved
into a kind of regional chamber of commerce during the war years, help-
ing to attract defense industries with its cheap power. After the war, while
not entirely abdicating the public power movement and continuing to fos-
ter rural electrification, BPA's primary efforts were devoted to increasing
the electric capacity of the region, rather than to encouraging additional
public takeovers of private utilities. Although it would be inaccurate to
describe the war and post-war years as a period in which public and pri-
vate utilities completely buried their hatchet, the era witnessed opera-
tional integration of the system and laid the groundwork for the region-
wide cooperation that would become the dominant characteristic of the
Pacific Northwest electric power industry in the 1950's.
A. Preparing for War
In 1938, with war impending in Europe and with the power shortages
of World War I in mind, FDR asked the Federal Power Commission and
the War Department to survey the adequacy of the nation's power capac-
ity. 139 Their report concluded that the country faced serious power defi-
cits in the event of war and recommended that immediate steps be taken
to rectify the situation. However, their proposal to use Reconstruction
Finance Corporation funds to finance defense power plants was disputed
by public power advocates like Interior Secretary Ickes who believed that
loans to private power companies would undermine the New Deal's pub-
137. See P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 264-65.
138. See id. at 208 (describing an Oregonian eulogy of J.D. Ross praising him for persuading the
federal government to invest in transmission lines which consequently required BPA to find or create
new power uses, especially new industries, in order to meet its federal repayment obligations).




lic power program. 140 Without such government assistance, private utili-
ties, which feared that expansion of their generating capacity would be an
economic liability if war was averted, refused to expand. 141 This stale-
mate persisted until Pearl Harbor. 142 Three weeks after the Japanese at-
tack, the private industry's Edison Electric Institute reported a nationwide
power shortage. 143
B. BPA Goes to War
While the rest of the nation was power-short going into the war, the
Pacific Northwest was better situated. When Grand Coulee was com-
pleted in 1941, the region was blessed with a surfeit of power. Given
authority to market Grand Coulee power by executive order, 144 BPA
moved aggressively to complete the transmission line between Bonneville
and Grand Coulee and to enter into contracts with defense-related indus-
tries. The agency also conducted industrial site surveys that helped the
Defense Plant Corporation locate numerous electro-process plants
throughout the region. 145 By 1942, ninety-two percent of BPA's load was
committed to industry. 146
140. The FPC suggested financing new plants with RFC loans, leasing equipment to private in-
dustries, or issuing direct RFC loans to private utilities to finance plant expansion. Ickes believed that
government funds would enable private utilities to free up additional money to support their efforts to
undermine the public power movement, recalling the money private utilities invested in litigating the
constitutionality of the TVA and in defeating public utility formation in the Northwest elections. See
supra notes 89 & 97. Not all New Dealers shared Ickes' antipathy toward private utilities, and some,
like George Norris, feared Ickes' empire building more than federal cooperation with the private
utility industry. P. FuNIGiELLO, supra note 79, at 233,238-42, 247-54.
141. Id. at 239-40. This refusal paralleled the private utility position in the pre-World WarI era,
when the utilities resisted incurring the increased costs of expansion because they believed increased
demand would be temporary and because state public utility commissions refused to allow an in-
creased rate of return despite this uncertainty. As a result of utility intransigence, in 1918 the War
Industries Board abandoned expansion attempts and imposed power rationing. Id. at 230-31.
142. This private utility recalcitrance may have influenced the conclusions of the Temporary
National Economic Committee, an interdepartmental committee commissioned by Congress to study
monopoly power and make recommendations. See C. GooDwiN, W. BARBER, J. COCHRANE, N. MAR-
cm, & J. YAGER, ENERGY POLICY IN PERsPEcivE 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as C. GOODwiN]. The
Committee's 1938-41 investigation, which coincided with the interim between the FPC/War Depart-
ment study and the onset of the war, concluded that "curtailed production for selfish ends [can be
counteracted by] the development of competing industries," and recommended that the government
would have to assume responsibility for ensuring adequate supplies during the war and competitive
prices after the war. Id. at 5.
143. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 123-24.
144. Exec. Order No. 8526, 3 C.F.R. 704 (1938-1943 Comp.), amended by Exec. Order No.
12038, 3 C.F.R. 136 (1978 Comp.); see BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 124.
145. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 125.
146. Id. at 123. In 1943, these power loads included the "mystery load," which, of course, was
the Atomic Energy Commission's Hanford Reservation. Id. at 125.
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The early war years saw numerous defense contracts awarded to Pacific
Northwest industries. 147 BPA embarked on a crash transmission line con-
struction program to meet defense plant deadlines. 148 The agency also
stepped up considerably its schedule for installation of generators at
Bonneville and Grand Coulee. 149 However, rural electrification was
stymied by material shortages (especially copper wiring) and limited non-
defense budgets.
Perhaps the most noteworthy effect of the war on the Northwest hy-
droelectric system was its inducement to interconnection. BPA intercon-
nection studies prompted the War Production Board in 1942 to order in-
terconnected operations of the region's utilities to maximize efficiency. 50
This order prompted formation of the Northwest Power Pool, a voluntary
partnership of the region's utilities designed to increase cooperation and
information sharing. Interconnection of utility operations had the short-
run effect of enabling the region to meet power loads despite the lowest
streamflows in more than fifty years that fall, 151 but its long-run effects
were more significant. Interconnection signalled the beginning of an era
in which public and private utilities would operate their projects as would
one utility, which remains the chief characteristic of system operations
today. 152
C. Planning for the Post-War Era
The economic boom that the war brought to the Northwest spurred in-
terest in additional water projects. Although the Roosevelt Administra-
tion opposed any new project unless justified as an emergency war mea-
147. In June 1940, Congress passed the $5 billion Military Appropriation Act of 1941, ch. 343.
54 Stat. 350 (1940), as an aid in attaining the U.S. production goal of 50,000 aircraft per year. The
Act netted $500 million in defense contracts for Oregon and Washington, proving once again that war
is good for business. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 124.
148. BPA transmission lines expanded from approximately 140 miles in 1940 to nearly 1200
miles in 1941 and to over 2500 miles by 1944, when construction fell off because appropriations were
going to direct defense efforts. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 127.
149. In 1940, BPA's annual report called for 10 Bonneville generators and six Grand Coulee
generators to be installed by 1944. Four more Grand Coulee generators were to be installed by 1948.
However, due to the war, all 10 of Bonneville's generators were installed by the end of 1943, and 15
Coulee units were on line by 1945. Id. at 126.
150. 7 Fed. Reg. 3266 (1942). A number of public power advocates in BPA were not enthusias-
tic about the interconnection order, correctly perceiving that it would help to undermine efforts to
enact comprehensive regional power authority legislation. P. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 79, at 224. See
infra text accompanying notes 173-75.
151. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 126.
152. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, THE ROLE OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, INCLUDING ITS PARTICIPATION IN A HY-
DRO-THERMAL POWER PROGRAM 1-10 (Dec. 1980) (Final Environmental Impact Statement) [hereinaf-




sure, 153 a considerable amount of post-war planning was underway. The
upper Columbia Basin was studied for storage project sites in 1943, re-
sulting in the authorization of the Bureau of Reclamation's Hungry Horse
project a year later. 154 Released from executive control by the demise of
central water planning 155 and prodded by a fear of post-war depression,
Congress authorized an unprecedented number of water projects in the
1944 Flood Control Act 156 and the 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act. 157 Both
statutes authorized projects that would be constructed during the post-war
era; for example, the Snake River developments authorized in the 1945
Act would not be completed until the mid-1970's. 158
New water project development could not, however, avoid post-war
economic problems without an expanding industrial base to compensate
for the slowdown in defense industries at the war's end. Production cur-
tailments in the shipbuilding and aluminum industries led to layoffs and a
power surplus of more than a million kilowatts by 1946.159 In fact, this
153. See Blumm, supra note 6, at231.
154. See id. at 232; BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 127. The Columbia Basin was also investi-
gated for its irrigation potential in the early 1940's. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 17. Looking ahead
to the post-war era, in 1943 Congress enacted the Columbia Basin Project Act, ch. 14, 57 Stat. 14
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 835, 835c-835c-4 (1976)), which reauthorized the Grand
Coulee Dam as a reclamation project and enabled the Secretary of the Interior to sell public lands in
the vicinity of the dam to encourage "the permanent settlement of farm families." 16 U.S.C. § 835c
(1976).
155. Congress abolished the Natural Resources Planning Board (NRPB) in 1943. B. HOLMES,
supra note 25, at 22. This ended a decade of New Deal attempts to maintain control over water
projects through a central planning agency, an idea that germinated in the Progressive Era. See supra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text. After the termination of the NRPB, control over new projects
increasingly was left to local congressional delegations through the Public Works Committees, which
developed close working relationships with development agencies like the Corps of Engineers and the
Bureau of Reclamation. See supra note 106; B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 23, 38; see also C.
GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 175 (noting Congress' preference for decentralized electric power ad-
ministration).
156. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, §§ 1-8, 15, 58 Stat. 887 (codified in scattered sections
of 16, 33, & 43 U.S.C.). The Act made it clear that the Corps of Engineers, given substantial flood
control responsibility in 1936, was the nation's chief flood control agency. On the other hand, the
Department of the Interior was given power to market power produced at Corps projects, solidifying
the role of power marketing agencies like Bonneville. As did the 1937 Bonneville Project Act, the
Flood Control Act directed that power be marketed to promote widespread use, at low prices, and
preferably to public bodies, effectively extending the Bonneville principles nationwide. See C.
GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 172. The preference clause contained in section 5 of the 1944 Act
infuriated private utilities who wished to see the Corps sell power from its projects at the bus bar.
Private utility supporters promised a repeal of section 5 after the anticipated election of Thomas
Dewey as President in 1948. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 72.
157. River and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10. The 1945 Act authorized the McNary
Dam and the mainstem dams on the lower Snake. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 233-34.
158. The Lower Granite Dam was completed in April, 1975. See DEIS, supra note 17, Appen-
dix A, at 1-3.
159. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 134. BPA's load dropped from nine billion kilowatt hours
(kwh) in fiscal year 1945 to 6.2 billion kwh the following year. Id. at 128.
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power surplus threatened to undermine attempts to expand the Northwest
hydroelectric system, as private utilities, fearing additional public power
projects, testified to Congress that no additional federal dams were
needed. 160 Clearly, if the Pacific Northwest was to use its water power
potential as the springboard to economic development, the region could
not afford fractious public-versus-private power disputes.
D. BPA as a Regional Chamber of Commerce
With its role as power marketer assured by the war's end, 161 Bonne-
ville moved to expand its role as a regional economic planner. In 1945,
BPA Administrator Paul Raver asked his superiors at the Interior Depart-
ment whether the appropriate post-war federal role was limited to market-
ing existing power supplies, or whether the agency should anticipate fu-
ture needs and help ensure that supplies were adequate to meet increased
future demands. 162 Sanctioning the latter course of action, the Interior
Department, which still harbored hopes of becoming the nation's central
energy planner, 163 ratified BPA's industrial sales policy, pursuant to
which BPA sold half of its million kilowatt surplus to the aluminum in-
dustry in 1946.164 Increased industrial sales in subsequent years evapo-
rated the surplus and created a close relationship between BPA and its
industrial customers that persists to this day. 165 In fact, the region experi-
enced shortages in 1948, which prompted the agency to begin selling one
quarter of the industrial load as "interruptible power."1 66 Today this in-
terruptible "top quartile" of the industrial load supplies the region with
reserve capacity in low water years. 167
BPA also took steps to overcome private utility resistance to expanding
federally produced electricity, playing an instrumental role in the 1946
160. Id. at 134.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49.
162. See C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 176.
163. See id. at 14 (describing the aspirations of Secretary Ickes and Undersecretary Abe Fortas):
infra note 176.
164. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 134. Industrial power sales were seen as means to finance
Northwest project development in a series of studies from 1932 to 1937. See id. at 132. Paying for
projects with industrial sales was, of course, an old Progessive notion. See supra note 46.
165. Recent litigation challenges this close relationship. See, e.g., Central Lincoln Peoples' Util.
Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.) (BPA power sale contracts with industrial customers
invalidated as violative of the public power preference provision in the 1937 Bonneville Project Act),
amended, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983)
(No. 82-1071).
166. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 136.
167. See, e.g., Blumm & Johnson, Promising a Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Elec-





founding of the Tacoma Conference, later named the Pacific Northwest
Utilities Conference Committee (PNUCC), a coalition of public and pri-
vate utilities and industries. 168 More than simply an advisory commit-
tee, 169 PNUCC assembled individual utility forecasts, lobbied in Con-
gress for new dams and increased appropriations, and played a critical
role in expanding the system during the post-war years. By preaching a
"gospel of growth," in which additional supplies of hydropower were
assumed to be essential to the economic development of the region,
PNUCC provided a means by which the region's public and private utili-
ties and electroprocess industries began to cooperate closely with each
other. While their disagreements certainly did not disappear, 170 under
BPA's leadership the seeds of regional cooperation were sown.
E. The Defeat of the Columbia Valley Authority
One source of disagreement between public and private utilities that
survived the formation of PNUCC concerned proposals to establish a Co-
lumbia Valley Authority, with comprehensive powers comparable to
those of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Originally a New Deal pro-
posal, the CVA was shelved as part of the 1937 compromise that enabled
passage of the Bonneville Project Act. 171 But the old New Deal dream of
one agency responsible for project construction and operation, as well as
power marketing, did not die easily. After the surprising reelection of
President Truman in 1948, the President attempted to deliver on his cam-
paign pledge to create additional Valley Authorities in the Columbia and
Missouri River Basins.172 However, old interagency jealousies and the
168. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 134, 161. BPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the Water and
Power Resources Service serve as ex officio members of PNUCC. See Hittle, Larsen, Randall &
Michie, supra note 7, at 263.
169. Advisory committees, composed largely of regulated firms, proliferated in the post-war era
as one means of preserving the efficiencies of the business/government partnership that won the war.
These committees were criticized by Assistant Secretary of Interior Girard Davidson, who thought
they enabled regulated firms to play too large a role in policy formulation. Despite his reform efforts,
advisory committees resumed their prominence during the Korean crisis. See C. GOODWIN, supra
note 142, at 28, 47. Advisory committees such as the Bonneville Regional Advisory Council, the
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, and the Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission, have
always had an important influence on BPA. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 168-69. In 1972, Con-
gress imposed some controls on the formation, membership, and procedures of such committees,
enacting the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). See W.
RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64-72 (1977).
170. For an example of continuing public power distrust of private utilities during the war, see
Coleman, Rank-and-File Kilowatts, in AMERICA'S ENERGY, supra note 72, at 81.
171. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
172. B. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 23, 27. During the campaign, Truman assailed his opponents
as foes of power for the masses who would sabotage public power and irrigation projects and make
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steadfast opposition of the private utility industry combined to defeat the
CVA in favor of the 1950 Rivers and Harbors Act, which authorized a
number of new Columbia Basin projects. 173 Apparently, the institutional
arrangements thought by New Dealers to be only "provisional" had set-
tled; 174 by 1950 it was not politically feasible to restructure them. 175
However, the "gospel of growth" assured that there would be additional
projects for the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to
construct and operate; power for BPA to market and sell; and, for more
than a decade, enough cheap electricity to meet the demands of both pub-
lic and private utilities and the electroprocess industry. 176
What little hope there remained for a CVA dissipated with the onset of
the Korean War. The war not only deflected Administration attention
from issues like the CVA, it also led to reduced appropriations for federal
power projects. 177 Although BPA funding remained strong through this
period, 178 the uncertainties inherent in the congressional appropriations
the West an economic colony of Wall Street. He saw valley authorities as a means to prevent this
colonization. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 180.
173. Ch. 188, § 204, 64 Stat. 163, 170 (1950). Opposition of the Corps of Engineers and the
Bureau of Reclamation to the CVA was portrayed in a 1945 article in The Nation. See McWilliams,
The Northwest Needs a CVA, 160 NATION 622 (June 1945). The Albeni Falls, Libby, John Day,
Priest Rapids, and The Dalles Dams were authorized by the 1950 Act, although the Priest Rapids
Dam was ultimately developed by a nonfederal interest (Grant County PUD). See Blumm, supra note
6, at 235-36, 241.
174. See supra note 123. The CVA's prospects were heavily influenced by inconsistent fore-
casts. The Department of the Interior, which favored the CVA, projected considerable power short-
ages and called for immediate action, while those who were not CVA advocates tended to forecast a
less bleak future. Power shortages in the winter of 1948-1949, the second winter in a row in which
power was short, while not severe enough to pass CVA legislation, contributed to the public's fear
that energy shortages would lead to depression. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 184.
175. One of the principal reasons for the failure of CVA legislation was the departure of its
strongest proponents, Secretary Julius Krug and Assistant Secretary Girard Davidson, a former BPA
General Counsel, from the Interior Department. CVA opponents, chiefly private utilities, charged
that the legislation would lead the country down the road to socialism. They also contended that CVA
was unneeded because the Great Depression had passed, because the Pacific Northwest did not have
the same kind of "homogeneous problems" as the Tennessee Valley, and because Keynesian eco-
nomics had demonstrated that economic recessions could be combatted with fiscal policies other than
public works spending. See C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 183-84.
176. See, e.g., BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 162 (noting that because of BPA's "persistent
efforts" I I dams were under construction in 1953); id. at 179-81 (describing the search for upstream
storage in the Upper Columbia Basin); C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 186 (describing the 1950
Report of the Water Resource Policy Commission, which recommended, inter alia, constructing wa-
ter projects in advance of power trends).
177. Like World War II, the Korean conflict generally reduced appropriations for public power,
a welcome development as far as the private utility industry was concerned. However, the Interior
Department complained that reduced appropriations were inappropriate because, in contrast to the
pre-war era, there was no longer any unused capacity. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 189.
178. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 159-60. The Korean conflict also led the federal govern-
ment to encourage the siting of new aluminum plants to assist in the defense effort. For example, the
Harvey Aluminum plant at The Dalles, Oregon, was lured to the region in 1952. W. RODGERS, supra
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process led to a long struggle to place BPA revenues on a self-financing
basis. 179 Wartime power shortages also led to recommendations that BPA
be given "purchase authority," with which it could support the develop-
ment of thermal plants to "firm up" uncertain hydroelectric supplies, and
to a one-year experiment with "median water year" planning, issues that
would resurface in the 1970's and 1980's. 180
IV. THE PARTNERSHIP YEARS
The inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower as President in January 1953
had important effects on the development of the hydroelectric system.
Rejecting the federal role as project developer, the Republicans autho-
rized no new federal projects. Instead, the federal government backed off
from planned developments on the mid-Columbia and middle Snake in
favor of nonfederal projects. However, despite the lack of new projects,
the federal hydroelectric system continued to grow throughout the Eisen-
note 133, at 166-67. Such plants profited not only from government-supplied tax breaks and cheap
power, but also, in some cases, from delaying installation of air pollution devices to control fluoride
emissions until judicially compelled to do so. See Rencken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
169 (D. Or. 1963) (ordering the installation of electrostatic precipitators). See also Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958) (affirming an award of damages), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 840 (1958); W. RODGERS, supra note 133, at 164-65 (discussing a 17-year legal fight between a
cattle rancher and the Reynolds Metal plant in Troutdale, Oregon); id. at 168-71, 184-88 (describing
the aluminum industry's influence over state and federal regulators).
179. Congress finally granted self-financing authority to BPA in the 1974 Columbia River Trans-
mission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-454, 88 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 838-838k
(1976 & Supp. V 198 1)). BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 256.
180. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 136 (median water year planning during 1950); id. at
182-87 (describing BPA's efforts to obtain "public utility responsibility" under which it would be
obliged to meet all regional power needs); C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 181 (coal plants to sup-
plement hydropower). Except in 1950, hydroelectric operations have been premised on "critical wa-
ter year planning," which assumes worst case streamflow conditions, rather than average water year
conditions, will occur. Under critical water year planning, reservoir levels are held higher than under
median water planning. The result is reduced average hydropower production, but greater reliability
in low water years. For a discussion of critical water year planning and system operations, see NATU-
RAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, May 1982, at 3-5.
Authority to purchase power on a "short-term" basis (five years or less) to firm up hydropower
supplies was conferred upon BPA in the 1974 Columbia River Transmission Act, 16 U.S.C. § 838
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); long term purchase authority was withheld until the 1980 Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp. V 1981), although BPA's
practice of "net billing" plants in the late 1960's and early 1970's was tantamount to purchase au-
thority. For a variety of perspectives on BPA's purchase authority, see Cavanagh, The Pacific North-
west Power Planning (and Thermal Power Plant Reliej) Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 27 (1980);
Luce & McLennan, Acquisition of Energy Resources Under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act: A Look to the Future, 5 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 61 (1981); Michie,
Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act on the Development
of Energy Sources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition Priority Scheme,
4 U. PuGEr SOUND L. REv. 299 (1981).
Washington Law Review
hower years as previously authorized projects were completed. More-
over, the proliferation of nonfederal projects prompted greater coordina-
tion to increase system reliability.
A. The Reverse Yardstick
Like its successor thirty years later, the Republican administration of
1953 emphasized marketplace economics and sought to reduce the role of
the federal government. 181 In his 1953 State of the Union Message, the
newly-elected president asserted that "[t]he best natural resources pro-
gram for America will not result from exclusive dependence on Federal
bureaucracy. It will involve a partnership of State and local communities,
private citizens, and the Federal Government, all working together." 182
That the new partnership philosophy was a product of the new Admin-
istration's close ties with the private utility industry was apparent almost
immediately. Philosophically opposed to having the nation's taxpayers
subsidize rates in geographically favored locations like the Columbia and
Tennessee River Valleys, 183 the Administration took swift steps to elimi-
nate pressure to create public power systems. For example, in June 1953
Eisenhower's Interior Secretary Douglas McKay terminated construction
of a BPA transmission line in southwestern Oregon and sold the right-of-
way to a private utility. 184 Three months later, in an effort to reduce rate
disparities, the Interior Department announced that any federally pro-
duced power not committed to public utilities in long term contracts
would be sold to private utilities on a long term basis. Consequently,
BPA negotiated twenty-year contracts with a number of private power
companies, assuring them of access to low-cost hydropower until 1973, a
result public power partisans branded "the reverse yardstick." 185
181. William Barber lists four basic premises of Eisenhower Administration energy policies: (1)
a greater role for the private sector in the economy; (2) a preference for state and local government as
government units closest to the people; (3) federal action grounded on sound business principles; and
(4) federal neutrality concerning regional competition. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 208. These
premises led to a distrust of public power agencies such as BPA and TVA, and also to authorization
of private energy development in the nuclear energy field. See id. at 209-10.
182. State of the Union Message by President Dwight D. Eisenhower (Feb. 2, 1953), quoted in
BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 189. The Interior Department's power policy statement, issued in
August of 1953, made it clear that this partnership would involve a reduced federal role, and that
additional generating capacity should be financed not by the federal treasury, but by private, state,
and local funds. Eisenhower reiterated this policy statement in his speech dedicating the McNary
Dam in 1954, stating that the federal government should not be expected to meet all electric demands
and warning that federal power led to centralization and monopoly control that was inimical to indi-
vidual freedom. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 269-70.
183. C. GOODWIN. supra note 142, at 210.





B. Nonfederal Project Development
Given the Republicans' antipathy toward federal intervention and pub-
lic power, it is not surprising that they quickly rejected a 1952 recommen-
dation of the Truman-appointed National Security Resources Board for
increased federal funding of new hydroelectric projects. 186 In fact, Secre-
tary McKay blamed electric shortages in the Pacific Northwest on the ex-
istence of federal power, not on a shortage of it. 187 The Eisenhower Ad-
ministration chose to let private utilities determine whether new projects
should be constructed, restricting new federal developments to situations
where power needs were beyond the capabilities of local utilities. 188
Spurred by favorable tax laws and increased demand from defense indus-
tries in response to the Korean crisis, 189 nonfederal generating capacity in
the Northwest nearly quadrupled during the 1950's. 190
Two important areas of nonfederal development were on the mid-Cd-
lumbia above Hanford and on the Snake above Hells Canyon. Federal
development of both reaches was envisioned in the 1948 revision to the
Corps' "308" report. 191 However, in early 1953 the Interior Department
discontinued opposition to the Idaho Power Company's application to de-
velop the middle Snake. 192 Although public power advocates challenged
the private utilities' plans before the Federal Power Commission, the
courts, and Congress, the FPC's decision to license three dams was af-
firmed in 1956.193 On the mid-Columbia, after Congress revoked-federal
authorization of the Priest Rapids Dam in 1954,194 the FPC licensed four
nonfederal projects to three Washington public utility districts, 195 thus
186. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 207-09.
187. Id. at 270 (citing Discussion of Budget Circular A-47 and the Related Power Partnership
Principles: Hearing before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.
43 (1955) (statement of Douglas McKay, Secretary of the Interior)).
188. C. GooDwrN, supra note 142, at 209.
189. Defense-oriented projects that received Defense Electric Power Administration Certificates
could write off about 65% of project costs against corporate income taxes over five years. See BPA
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 192. As a corollary, the government had begun to cut funding for federal
water projects even before Eisenhower's election. Id. at 192. However, appropriations for BPA con-
struction and operations did not begin to fall until 1953. Id. at 160, 196.
190. Nonfederal capacity, which was 2 million kilowatts in 1953, grew by late 1960 to 7.5 mil-
lion kilowatts completed or under construction. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 273.
191. H.R. Doc. No. 531,81st Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix I, 1482-90(1950).
192. See BPA HIstORY, supra note 20, at 192.
193. In re Idaho Power Co., 14 F.P.C. 55, 71-82 (1955) (FPC decision to license the dams);
National Hells Canyon Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 237 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (subsequent
unsuccessful attempt to have FPC's decision reversed), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
194. Priest Rapids Dam Act, ch. 589,68 Stat. 573 (1954).
195. Licenses were issued to the Grant County PUD to construct the Priest Rapids and Wanapum
Dams, Order Issuing License, 14 F.P.C. 1067 (1955), to the Chelan County PUD to construct the
Rocky Reach Dam, Orderlssuing License, 16 F:P.C. 736 (1956), and to the Douglas County PUD to
construct the Wells Dam, Order Issuing License, 28 F.P.C. 128 (1962). Chelan County PUD's Rock
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avoiding another public-versus-private battle. In fact, construction of the
four mid-Columbia dams ushered in a new era of cooperation between
public and private utilities. Private utilities supplied necessary capital by
signing long term contracts to purchase the electric output from the dams;
public utilities, which enjoyed an FPC licensing preference, owned and
operated the dams, financing construction with low-interest, tax-exempt
bonds. 196 Thus, withdrawal of the federal government as project dev-
eloper induced the kind of public-private joint ventures that would char-
acterize thermal plant development a decade later.
Although no federal projects were initiated during the Eisenhower
years, the federal partner was not inactive. Congress continued to appro-
priate money to construct previously authorized projects and to extend
BPA lines to rural areas. 197 However, the boom in nonfederal projects,
coupled with an economic recession and a poor aluminum market, re-
duced BPA power sales in the late 1950's.198 Reduced power sales pro-
duced BPA deficits and a power surplus, 199 a situation that would have an
important influence on policymakers in the 1960's.
C. Wheeling
The power partnership of the 1950's produced a diverse system of fed-
eral and nonfederal projects linked by BPA's transmission line grid. With
increasing amounts of nonfederal power coming on line, the BPA grid
offered utilities a potential means of transmitting their new power sup-
plies to markets without having to construct new lines. This presented the
question whether BPA had the authority to transmit, or wheel,200 power
Island Dam, the Columbia River's first mainstem dam, was originally licensed by the Federal Power
Commission in 1930 over the objections of commercial salmon fishing interests. See Blumm. supra
note 6, at 229 n.77. A new license for the dam, issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(successor to the Federal Power Commission) on May 13, 1981, has been challenged by the Yakima
Indian Nation, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the National Wildlife Federation because it
allegedly failed to include fish and wildlife protective provisions. National Wildlife Federation v.
FERC, No. 82-7562 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 29, 1982). See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST. 20 ANA-
DROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, Jan. 1983, at 14-15; 2 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AcT REPORT, No. 5.
March 4, 1983, at 6-7.
196. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA& M. MARTS, supranote 11, at 53.
197. Federal capacity, including projects under construction, increased from 2.6 to eight million
kilowatts during the Eisenhower years. C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 273; cf. BPA HISTORY,
supra note 20, at 200 (federal capacity (nameplate rating) increased from 2.46 million kilowatts in
June 1952, to six million kilowatts in June 1960; during this period, BPA transmission grid expanded
from approximately 5000 to 8000 circuit-miles).
198. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 199-200.
199. Id.
200. "Wheeling" is transmission of power for another party, usually pursuant to long term con-




for others. The answer, and how it was supplied, says a good deal about
BPA, its relationship with Congress, and its emerging regional role.
The 1937 Bonneville Project Act201 did not address the wheeling issue
and it is likely that many of its supporters would have opposed wheeling
since such cooperative arrangements were not characteristic of that era.
Moreover, in the 1930's, the public power movement had more ambitious
goals than a peaceful coexistence with private utilities. 202 However, in
1940 BPA General Counsel, Alan Hart, concluded that BPA could
transmit power for private companies because, by charging utilities for
the use of excess line capacity, BPA could reduce the cost of public
power. 203 Despite lack of clear congressional direction, Hart's opinion
was affirmed in two opinions of the Regional Solicitor in 1955 and 1956
expressing BPA's willingness to wheel power from two public utility-
owned dams. 204 In 1957, Congress appropriated money to construct two
BPA lines principally for wheeling, 205 and a committee report agreed
with the Solicitor that BPA possessed the authority to wheel nonfederal
power. 206 But it was not until 1974, nearly twenty years after large-scale
wheeling began, that Congress expressly authorized BPA wheeling. 207
Wheeling was necessary to realize the power partnership envisioned by
the Eisenhower Administration. Wheeling also supplied an increasingly
important source of BPA revenues. Yet this practice of relying on legal
opinions of the Solicitor and statements of Appropriation Committees
would lead BPA to construe expansively its authority in the 1960's, re-
sulting in what became known as its Hydro-Thermal Power Program.
Whether legislatively authorized or not, wheeling produced substantial
regional benefits. By establishing region-wide transfers, wheeling in-
duced coordinated operations, reduced the risk of short term shortages,
and, perhaps most importantly, supplied electric reserves without the cost
201. 16 U.S.C. § 832(1976); see supra notes 117-24.
202. See supra part IIB.
203. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 203-04.
204. Id. at 204.
205. Public Works Appropriation Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-167, 71 Stat. 416 (1957).
206. S. RaP. No. 609, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1957). On the other hand, the House Appro-
priations Committee thought that BPA should obtain express authorization for wheeling before com-
mitting funds to the lines. H.R. Rap. No. 552, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1957). The Senate Commit-
tee disagreed, supporting the Regional Solicitor's opinion that the language in section 2(b) of the
Bonneville Project Act (authorizing transmission lines for "interconnection and interchange of elec-
tric energy" between Bonneville and other federal projects and public power systems) was sufficient
legislative authority to construct lines for wheeling. S. REP. No. 609, supra, at 38-39. See BPA
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 202, 205.
207. The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act, 16 U.S.C.§§ 838g & 838h (1976),
expressly authorized BPA wheeling, but required that wheeling charges reflect an equitable allocation
of costs and be approved by the Federal Power Commission. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 206.
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of constructing additional generating units. 208 In short, wheeling in-
creased region-wide reliability and encouraged nonfederal water project
developments by eliminating the need for a good deal of transmission line
construction. As a result, by the close of the partnership years, BPA had
assumed a central role in both public and private utility planning and op-
erations. This role was to expand far beyond power marketing in the
1960's.
V. THE GOLDEN AGE
The 1960's, BPA's "golden age," brought significant changes to the
Northwest's hydroelectric system. The decade began with BPA financial
deficits and power surpluses. But these surpluses were soon dissipated
through a doubling of industrial power sales. The storage capacity of the
system was also doubled when the Columbia River Treaty was ratified,
culminating twenty years of negotiation and study. The Treaty spawned
numerous contractual agreements between BPA and its customers, in-
creasing coordinated system operations and interregional connection. Fi-
nally, the region's first large commitment to thermal power was made
when cogeneration facilities were added to the Hanford New Production
Reactor.
A. Doubling Industrial Power Sales
As previously observed, 209 in the late 1950's a soft economy and a
proliferation of nonfederal power projects left BPA with a surfeit of
power. A series of budget deficits evaporated the agency's accumulated
surplus and jeopardized its ability to fulfill its repayment obligations. 210
Administrator Charles Luce saw three possible courses for action: (1)
modify repayment schedules, (2) increase power sales, or (3) raise
rates. 211 Because Luce felt that a rate increase would impair regional eco-
nomic growth, he emphasized the other two alternatives. He adopted a
208. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 203, 206-07 (noting that wheeling revenues grew from
$4.4 million in 1965 to $25.5 million in 1978).
209. See supra text accompanying note 199.
210. Section 7 of the 1937 Bonneville Project Act (16 U.S.C. § 832f (1976)) requires BPA to set
rates sufficient to recover the cost of producing and transmitting electricity, including amortizing
capital investment over a reasonable number of years. Between fiscal years 1957 and 1963, a $79
million cumulative BPA surplus dwindled to less than $3 million, and a cumulative deficit of $20
million was forecasted for 1965. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POLICIES GOVERNING THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION'S REPAYMENT OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS NEED REVISION 2-4
(198 1) [hereinafter cited as 1981 GAO REPORT].
211. 1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 210, at 4.
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new repayment policy, 212 and, reversing Republican policy, doubled in-
dustrial power sales.213 As a result, Luce was able to defer BPA's first
rate increase in twenty-seven years until 1965 and to limit it to less than
three percent. 214
While this strategy kept Northwest electric rates far below rates in
other regions of the country, it resulted in a repayment policy which the
General Accounting Office has criticized as inefficient and probably un-
fair. 215 Perhaps more significantly, increased industrial sales made the
prospective power shortfalls appear to be imminent. Consequently, in-
creased industrial sales helped to spur interest in expanding system capac-
ity.
B. The Columbia River Treaty
The most obvious means of increasing system capacity is to regulate
streamflows in order to maximize use of power generators. Because of the
great variations in Columbia Basin flows 216 without significant storage
capability, in high water years a large percentage of streamflows must be
spilled around run-of-the-river dams, thus producing no power. On the
other hand, in low flow years there is not enough water to maximize
power output. These realities produced longstanding interest in Upper
Basin storage projects. 217 Since thirty percent of the Columbia's stream-
212. Id. at 4-6 (describing the substitution of fixed repayment schedules for a "repayment study
concept" based on hypothetical forecasted revenues and costs).
213. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 215, 268. Eisenhower's Undersecretary of the Interior,
Ralph Tudor, ordered BPA to stop promoting industrial sales in 1953. In addition, Assistant Interior
Secretary Fred Aandahl ordered BPA to issue 20-year contracts to private utilities, effectively fore-
closing new industrial contracts during the 1950's. Id. at 267. See supra text accompanying note 185.
214. Id. at 214; 1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 210, at 5 (Administrator's contention that repay-
ment policy changes and increased power sales helped to avoid a possible 1965 rate increase of 30%).
215. The GAO found BPA's repayment policies to be confusing, unreliable, costly, and time-
consuming. It also questioned whether the policies imposed unsanctioned burdens on federal taxpay-
ers by amortizing recent, high interest-bearing investments first (deferring payment of older debts
until the end of the repayment period) and allowing cumulative repayment decreases. 1981 GAO
REPORT, supra note 210, at 9-12. Between 1970 and 1979, BPA made net repayments of $0.
Whereas prior to the elimination of repayment schedules, Bonneville had applied more than 36% of
its revenues to repayment, after 1965, the agency applied only about 7% of its revenues to repay-
ment. Id. at 8.
216. The Columbia's record high flows are 34 times higher than its record low flows. BPA HIs-
TORY, supra note 20, at 180.
217. Between 1927 and 1944, 11 applications for development of the Kootenai River were sub-
mitted to the International Joint Commission, created by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to resolve
boundary disputes between Canada and the United States. See Johnson, The Canada-United States
Controversy Over the Columbia River, 41 WASH. L. REv. 676, 711-12 (1966) (containing a thorough
analysis of the background, negotiations and issues of the Columbia River Treaty). The disastrous
floods of 1948 prompted the Corps of Engineers to recommend upstream storage projects in its re-
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flows originate in Canada, it is not surprising that studies of potential joint
Canadian-U.S. development were initiated in 1944.218 Fifteen years of
technical studies and legal and policy debates ensued. 219
The principal stumbling block to a bilateral agreement on Upper Basin
development concerned whether Canada should be entitled to a portion of
the downstream power production and flood control benefits in the United
States, and, if so, what share. 220 United States resistance to the concept of
downstream benefits precluded an agreement during the 1950's. Eventu-
ally, when Canada indicated it was prepared to proceed with an alterna-
tive, unilateral development plan on the Peace River, 221 the United
States, perhaps also influenced by mounting BPA deficits, 222 agreed to
share downstream benefits on an equal basis. 223 This agreement led to the
signing of the Columbia River Treaty on January 17, 1961, only days
before the end of the Eisenhower Administration.2 24 However, a dispute
between the British Columbia provincial government and the Canadian
federal government over who was to pay for the storage projects and
vised "308" report of that year. Blumm, supra note 6. at 235; BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at
227-30.
218. Responsibility for these studies was given to the International Joint Commission. Johnson,
supra note 217, at 712; Utton, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol, I LAND & WATER L. REV
181, 182-83 (1966); see also Sewell, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol Agreement, 4 NATU-
RAL RESOURCES J. 309, 313-14 (1964) (discussing the Commission's study and proposals).
219. See Johnson, supra note 217, at 713-36. For Canadian perspectives, see N. SWAINSON,
CONFLICT OVER THE COLUMBIA. THE CANADIAN BACKGROUND TO AN HISTORIC TREATY (1979), and
Cohen, Some Legal and Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute. 36 CANADIAN B. REV 25
(1958).
220. The issue whether the United States owed downstream benefits to Canada first arose in 1951
when the U.S. applied to the International Joint Commission to construct the Libby Dam. The United
States argued that under Article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, monetary compensation, but
not a share of downstream benefits, was available for damage done to Canada. See Boundary Waters
Treaty, Jan. I1, 1909, United States-Great Britain, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548. However.
Canada refused to permit construction of the dam, and, in fact, employed the U.S. arguments in
developing its own plans to unilaterally divert Columbia flows into the Fraser River. See Johnson.
supra note 217, at 713-26.
221. See Johnson, supra note 217, at 726-27.
222. "From fiscal year 1958 through fiscal year 1962 Bonneville's annual deficits on a cost ac-
counting basis totaled $47,539,822. During the same period, Bonneville spilled water which, if put
through its turbines and sold as electric power and energy at Bonneville's standard rates, would have
produced more than $149,000,000 additional revenue." Luce & Kaseburg, supra note 7, at 255 n.7
(citing 1958-62 BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION ANN. REP-).
223. In effect, the agreement adopted the equitable apportionment doctrine, formulated by the
United States Supreme Court to decide interstate water rights disputes. The agreement rejected the
1896 Harmon Doctrine, which sanctioned diversions by upstream nations over the protests of down-
stream nations. See 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281-82 (1895) (Harmon Doctrine); Johnson, supra note
217, at 696-98, 718-25, 758-59, (discussing Harmon Doctrine and equitable apportionment con-
cept).




where the power produced from these projects would be marketed pre-
vented ratification of the Treaty until 1964.225
C. Aftermath of the Treaty: System Coordination and the Intertie
The Treaty authorized construction of four large storage projects, dou-
bling the Basin's storage capacity. 226 Just as important, the Treaty in-
duced a number of 1964 agreements which increased interconnected sys-
tem operations and enhanced BPA's role as regional power marketer.
The first series of agreements was prompted by the fact that British
Columbia did not need the power produced by the Treaty projects. As a
result, in order to finance project construction, the Province sold its
power rights to a consortium of public utilities, the Columbia Storage
Power Exchange. 227 The Exchange then sold half of its Canadian entitle-
ment to four private utilities and half to forty-one public utilities. 228 Each
utility, in turn, transferred these variable entitlements to BPA in exchange
for firm power, especially for firm peaking capacity. 229 The result was
increased pressure on BPA to manipulate streamflows to meet peak power
demands .230
Maximizing the downstream benefits produced by the Treaty storage
projects required increased coordination among federal and nonfederal
project operators. Voluntary cooperation through the Northwest Power
Pool had long been a regional characteristic, but the Treaty's downstream
benefits principle was premised on a fully coordinated system. Conse-
quently, shortly after the Treaty was ratified in 1964, BPA, the Corps of
Engineers, and the region's utilities negotiated a long term agreement es-
tablishing detailed operating criteria, power exchange principles, and al-
location of downstream benefits. This Pacific Northwest Coordination
225. British Columbia wanted to finance simultaneous development of the Columbia and Peace
Rivers by selling the power produced from the Columbia River projects to the United States, while.
the Canadian federal government wanted the Canadian power entitlement used in Canada to promote
industrial growth. The Province prevailed, largely because it eliminated opposition by expropriating
two large private power companies. See Johnson, supra note 217, at 746-49; Sewell, supra note 218,
at319-23.
226. DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix A, at I-1 Ito -15. This additional storage capacity enhanced
the productive capacity of downstream projects by an estimated 1900 average megawatts. K. LEE, D.
KLEmK.4 & M. MARTs, supra note 12, at 54.
227. Because the Exchange was a non-profit corporation, the $314 million in revenue bonds it
sold to purchase the Canadian entitlement was tax exempt. Two hundred fifty-four million dollars
was paid to British Columbia to purchase its downstream benefits for 30 years. BPA HISTORY, supra
note 20, at 235-36.
228. Id. at 235.
229. See DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix A, at 1-28 to -30.
230. Id. at 1-30. Increased manipulation of streamflows to meet peak power loads adversely af-
fected anadromous fish runs. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 243-47, 251.
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Agreement formalized "the one-utility concept" under which system op-
erations are coordinated to maximize hydropower production. 231
Marketing the additional power resulting from the Treaty required an-
other agreement. Power sales to California, long considered a potential
solution for Northwest electric surpluses, 232 were given impetus by tech-
nological innovations 233 and by the Kennedy Administration, which saw
regional interties as the basis of a fully coordinated national power net-
work.2 34 The Treaty-produced power surfeit in the Northwest and the
electric loads in populous California seemed to be a convenient mar-
riage. 235 However, expanding BPA's service area outside the region
alarmed industrial customers, who feared that competition from addi-
tional preference customers would deprive them of the cheap power
which had lured them to the region.236 The result was the enactment of
the 1964 Northwest Regional Preference Act, 237 which limited BPA
power exports to surplus power for which there was no demand in the
Northwest. 238 Almost simultaneously with passage of the Preference Act,
Congress appropriated $45 million to fund the federal portion of intertie
lines that would in 1967 connect Los Angeles with the Northwest. 239
231. Bonneville Power Administration, Agreement for Coordination of Operations Among
Power Systems of the Pacific Northwest (1964) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Coordination Agreement]. See J. Jolliffe, C. Mohler & L. Dean, The Pacific
Northwest Coordination Agreement 5 (paper presented at the Institute of Electric and Electronics
Engineers Winter Power Meeting, Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1965) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review). The 1964 Coordination Agreement replaced short term agreements negotiated annually be-
ginning in 1961. One important innovation in the Coordination Agreement provides for federal pay-
ments for the downstream benefits provided to federal projects by upstream storage projects. See
BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 218-19. For an overview of operational planning under the Coordi-
nation Agreement, see Blumm, supra note 6, at 249-56.
232. The idea of an intertie from Vancouver, B.C., to Los Angeles was first suggested by Uni-
versity of Washington Professor Carl Magnusson in 1919. It received serious consideration after
World War II when electric shortages in California required a 20% curtailment in Pacific Gas and
Electric Company's electric loads for several months. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 237-38.
233. Economically viable transmission distance expanded from 300 miles in the early 1950's to
1500 miles by the early 1960's. See Luce & Kaseburg, supra note 7, at 253-56.
234. See C. GOODWIN, supra note 142, at 333-34.
235. For example, in the late 1950's, the electricity required to pump northern California water
south over the Tehachapi Mountains, pursuant to the California water plan, was estimated to be the
equivalent of the output of the Grand Coulee Dam. Luce & Kaseburg, supra note 7, at 254.
236. Id. at 256-57. Private utilities also felt threatened by public utilities in California because of
the preference clause in the Bonneville Act. 16 U.S.C. § 832c(b) (1976); see K. LEE, D. KLEMKA &
M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 55-56.
237. Pub. L. No. 88-552, 78 Stat. 756 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 837-837h (1976)).
238. For a detailed analysis of the origins and provisions of the 1964 Act, see Luce & Kaseburg,
supra note 7.
239. On August 14, 1964, two and one half weeks before President Johnson signed the Prefer-
ence Act, Congress approved the Public Works Appropriation Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-511, 78
Stat. 682 (1964). BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 244-45. Because intertie lines in California were
constructed by private utilities, public power partisans feared that these utilities would monopolize
218
Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage
Thus, the beneficiaries of the Canadian Treaty were not confined to the
Northwest.
Increased storage capacity also precipitated installation of generators at
downstream projects to meet peak load demands. Nearly every dam
downstream of the Treaty projects has added generators since 1964,240
beginning with authorization of a third powerhouse at Grand Coulee in
1966.241 Attesting to the growth of the system is the fact that some of the
strongest supporters of the new Coulee powerhouse were private utilities
in California, who would be provided additional low-cost peaking capac-
ity once the Intertie lines were completed. 242 Increasing reliance on hy-
dropower to meet peak demands would soon lead the region to seek to
satisfy its baseload demands through construction of thermal power
plants.
Thus, the legacies of the Columbia River Treaty were many and var-
ied. It resulted in greater coordination of system operations, led to Cali-
fornia power sales, and enhanced the peaking capacity of the hydropower
system. However, by harnessing the spring freshet upon which anadro-
mous fish depended for transportation to the ocean, the Treaty projects
and their aftermath contributed greatly to a precipituous decline of Upper
Basin fish runs. 243 Finally, in negotiating the Treaty and the subsequent
Coordination Agreement, and in lobbying for the Preference Act, intertie
authorization, and appropriations for project modifications, BPA
emerged from its partnership-era passivity. Although lacking the author-
ity of TVA, BPA possessed the administrative expertise and fiscal re-
sources to function as the region's central planning agency, so long as it
had the confidence of its utility and industrial customers. This was a role
which would become increasingly important as the region began to look
to thermal power.
D. The Hanford Agreement
As with the idea of constructing upstream storage, the notion of mixing
thermal power with hydropower to meet increased electric demands was
long considered by regional power planners. In fact, the electric shortages
accompanying the Korean War led Representative Henry Jackson to in-
troduce legislation in 1951 that would have enabled BPA to build and
their use. As a result, the Preference Act declared the Intertie to be a common carrier, guaranteeing
access to public power agencies. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 58.
240. For charts depicting projects under construction in 1976, see DEIS, supra note 17, Appen-
dix A, at 1-35 to -36.
241. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 247-51.
242. Id. at 248.
243. See, e.g., Blummi, supra note 6, at 217-21,245-47.
219
Washington Law Review
operate coal plants in southwestern Oregon.244 Four years later, Congress
asked the Corps of Engineers to revise its "308" report on the Columbia
River and its tributaries, and specifically requested the Corps to consider
a hydro-thermal power system. 245 In 1958, the Corps reported that feasi-
ble hydroelectric sites would be exhausted by 1965, and that future load
growth would have to be met with thermal power. 246 Such a mixed sys-
tem could advantageously use the flexibility of hydropower to meet peak
load demands, while thermal power could serve base loads. 247
The first thermal increment was a spillover from the defense complex
at Hanford. 248 In 1958, spurred by the Russian Sputnik threat, Congress
authorized a new plutonium-producing reactor for Hanford. 249 The reac-
tor was designed to permit generation of electricity from waste heat.
However, the Eisenhower Administration opposed any additional feder-
ally produced power, which, under the preference clause, would go to
public power agencies. 250 Even after the Kennedy Administration re-
jected the limited federal role of the partnership years, private power in-
terests convinced Congress to withhold funds necessary to construct co-
generation facilities.251
A solution to the statement was proposed by the Washington Public
Power Supply System (WPPSS), a coalition of public utilities which in
1960 initiated construction of the Packwood Lake Project. 252 Through the
244. H.R. 4963, 82d Cong., Ist Sess., 97 CONG. REC, 8988 (1951). This bill was shelved, partly
due to potential conflicts with Tacoma's proposed Cowlitz River dams. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20.
at 273.
245. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 274 (noting that TVA, the Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
pany, and Ontario Hydro previously had made the transition to a hydrothermal system).
246. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 66 (citing H.R. Doc. No 403, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958)); cf. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 283-84 (claiming that Northwest hy-
droelectric potential is only half developed).
247. See K. LEE. D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 66-68 (noting that in the North-
west, unlike most areas of the country, the cheaper cost resource (hydropower) is used for peaking
purposes, while the more expensive resource (thermal power) is employed to meet base loads).
248. The Hanford defense reservation in eastern Washington was founded in 1943 as a site for
several plutonium reactors which produced fuel for the atomic bombs that ended World War II. After
the War, Hanford continued to grow as the Cold War induced military planners to stockpile nuclear
weapons. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 221-22.
249. Atomic Energy Commission Appropriations Amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-519, 72 Stat. 358
(1958).
250. Opposition to federally produced, cogenerated power came both from private utilities' na-
tional lobbying organization, the Edison Electric Institute, and from coal state interests which feared
competition from nuclear power. Kai Lee suggests that Edison's opposition to the cogeneration proj-
ect was much stronger than the opposition from Northwest private utilities. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M.
MARTS, supra note 12, at 62-63.
251. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 223. See also DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix A. at 1-22 to
-23.
252. WPPSS was formed as a response to the Eisenhower partnership policy, which caused pub-




issuance of tax-exempt bonds and exchange agreements with BPA,
WPPSS offered what appeared to be a viable financing alternative to di-
rect federal development. However, an end run around congressional ap-
proval was blocked when the General Accounting Office ruled that any
contracts between WPPSS and the Atomic Energy Commission, which
operated the Hanford works, required the consent of Congress. 253 The
ensuing congressional debate produced a compromise, suggested by Se-
nator Jackson, in which half of the cogenerated power would be reserved
for private utilities and half for WPPSS. In September 1962, President
Kennedy signed into law this compromise, which led to the generation of
the region's first thermal power in 1966. 254
The legacy of the Hanford reactor, however, was larger than the intro-
duction of thermal power. Following congressional authorization, BPA
and WPPSS negotiated a financing scheme, popularly known as "net bill-
ing," that would form the cornerstone of subsequent thermal plant con-
struction. Under net billing, BPA agreed to purchase the output of the
plant, paying for it by issuing credits to participating utilities equal to
their construction costs, up to the amount of their annual BPA bills for
power and transmission line services. 255 By providing for federal pur-
chase of the Hanford plant's planned output, net billing created between
WPPSS and BPA a kind of joint venture not unlike the relationship be-
tween public and private utilities that made possible the construction of
the mid-Columbia dams. This financing scheme would be the fulcrum of
what would become known as the Hydro-Thermal Power Program.
VI. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HYDRO-THERMAL POWER
PROGRAM
When the Canada Treaty projects neared completion in the late 1960's,
most of the region's large-scale hydroelectric sites were developed. How-
their resources in private holding company fashion, this coalition of public utilities could afford to
construct larger projects, lowering costs by taking advantages of economies of scale. And because it
was composed of public entitites, WPPSS enjoyed the advantage of being able to raise funds throught
tax-exempt bonds. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 64. For a brief back-
ground of WPPSS and its initial undertaking, the Packwood Lake Project, see I WASHINGTON STATE
SENATE ENERGY AND UTILITIES COMMI-rEE WPPSS INQUIRY, 47TH LEG., CAUSES OF COST OVERRUNS
AND SCHEDULE DELAYS ON THE FIVE WPPSS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 8-9 (1981). For recent cost
estimates, see infra note 383.
253. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA& M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 64-65.
254. Atomic Energy Appropriations Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-701, 76 Stat 599. See K. LEE,
D. KLEmKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 65; BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 224-25. In 1964, the
first eight plutonium reactors were retired by President Johnson, leaving only the ninth, the New
Production Reactor, operational. Id. at 225.
255. In practice, credits were limited to 85% of the utilities' BPA bill. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M.
MARTS, supra note 12, at 80.
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ever, the decade that began with power surpluses ended with serious pro-
jected deficits. To avoid shortfalls, the region turned to coal and nuclear
generated thermal power. The additional costs of thermal power, how-
ever, made this transition difficult and controversial. And because of lim-
ited BPA authority and limited utility financing, far fewer thermal plants
were initiated than originally proposed. This inability to expand the sys-
tem prompted the movement to obtain a congressional solution in the late
1970's.
A. Phase ]
System expansion appeared to be a pressing need in the late 1960's.
Beginning in 1967, the long lead time to obtain siting approval for ther-
mal plants doubled BPA's planning horizon from ten to twenty years. 256
The expanded time horizon, the doubling of industrial power sales,2 57 and
the forecasting asssumptions of steady electric growth258 made power
shortfalls seem imminent.
Facing a projected tripling of power loads, the Joint Power Planning
Council, a consortium of BPA and over one-hundred public and private
utilities, formulated a long-range planning document calling for a $15 bil-
lion, twenty-year program of system expansion. This Hydro-Thermal
Power Program was refined a year later into a ten-year program calling
for seven thermal plants, additional hydroelectric generators to meet peak
load demands, and additional transmission facilities. 259 The thermal
plants were the fulcrum of the program. However, the federally-financed
hydroelectric and transmission facilities were estimated to require $5 bil-
lion of the originally estimated $7 billion cost of the program. 260
The key to the program was the net billing concept. First employed in
the acquisition of the Hanford-generating power, 26' this financing scheme
256. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 258. The six-year planning horizon for water resources
was instituted in 1931. See supra note 105. It was changed to 10 years by BPA in 1955. BPA HIs-
TORY, supra note 20, at 258.
257. See supra part VA.
258. Electric demand was expected to rise not only because of regional growth, but also from
anticipated increases in per capita electric consumption. The region's utilities claimed that these de-
mands should be met by expanding the system rather than through conservation measures. Among
the reasons for increased per capita consumption were: (1) increased per capita income resulting in
purchase of additional electric consumptive appliances, (2) development and marketing of such appli-
ances, (3) greater use of electricity for space heating, and (4) increased commercial and industrial
consumption to improve productivity. See DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix C, at 11-8.
259. BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 274-75; FEIS, supra note 152, 1-16 to -18.
260. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 83.
261. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
Vol. 58:175, 1983
Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage
made it possible for public utilities, most of which had little equity, 262 to
commit themselves to thermal plant construction. Net billing minimized
short term rate increases by spreading uniform wholesale rate increases
among all BPA customers. 263 Moreover, participating utilities not only
received credits on their BPA bills, they found ready markets for their
construction bonds, because BPA agreed to assume the risk of plant fail-
ures, thereby making the bonds regionally insured. 264 By enabling BPA
to purchase electric "futures," net billing allowed the agency to expand
the power system, an authority that Congress never expressly granted
it.265
Five years after its initiation, the Hydro-Thermal Program came to an
abrupt halt. First, skyrocketing construction costs exhausted BPA's net
billing capacity, as thermal plant costs outstripped its wholesale power
rates. Quite simply, further credits for additional plants would have ex-
ceeded the amount the customers owed BPA. 266 Second, a 1972 Internal
Revenue Service regulation removed the tax exemption from bonds fi-
nancing plants, if BPA were to purchase more than twenty-five percent of
the plant's output. 267 Thus, in late 1973, BPA terminated net billing, ef-
fectively ending Phase 1 of the program. 268
262. Most of the WPPSS participants are extremely small, relying on BPA for their generating
capacity and for transmission services. K. LEE, D. KLMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 76.
263. Moreover, the full costs of thermal plants were hidden because BPA's rates reflect average
system costs; that is, both high cost thermal power and low cost hydropower. Such "melded" rates
made increments of thermal power appear to be cheaper than in fact they were. Kai Lee has pointed
out that melded rates produce inequities such as making utilities which are not experiencing signifi-
cant load growth pay for part of the costs of meeting the incremental loads of those which are. Id. at
77, 81-82.
264. See Foote, Larsen & Maddox, supra note 7, at 843 (explaining provisions in BPA's net
billing contract concerning the output of the planned thermal plants).
265. In fact, Congress considered and rejected such authorities at least four times: first, when it
enacted the 1937 Bonneville Act, see supra part lID; second, when it rejected a Columbia Valley
Authority in 1949, see supra part IIIE; third, when it rejected Congressman Jackson's proposal to
authorize BPA construction of coal plants, see supra note 244 and accompanying text; finally, when
it rejected Senator Richard Neuberger's proposal to give BPA authority to construct thermal plants in
1958. See id.
BPA's legal justifications for net billing were based on advisory opinions from the Interior Solici-
tor and the General Accounting Office, a letter from a Chairman of a Congressional Subcommittee,
and favorable statements during Appropriations Committee hearings. See DEIS, supra note 17, Ap-
pendix A, at 1-20 to -21; see also 77 Int. Dec. 141 (1970) (Opinion of the Solicitor approving BPA's
net billing contract concerning the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, largely on the basis of § 2(f) of the
Bonneville Project Act, which gives the BPA Administrator the authority to enter into contracts under
such terms as he deems necessary to foster the 1937 Act's policies of promoting widespread use at the
lowest possible rates); Foote, Larsen & Maddox, supra note 7, at 847 n.98 (questioning the legal
authority of the program).
266. FEIS, supra note 152, at 1-16 to -17.
267. Id.atl-17.
268. Id. See also Foote, Larsen & Maddox, supra note 7, at 844.
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Although it was short-lived, the Phase 1 program's legacies proved to
be enduring ones. Construction of seven thermal plants began, 269 largely
because BPA had secured agreement between public and private utilities
on the need for and direction of an integrated plan for system expansion.
The centerpiece of the plan-net billing financing-enabled equity-short
public utilities to participate, shifted the risks of nonperformance to BPA,
and hid the incremental costs of thermal power. However, net billing
eventually resulted in steep BPA wholesale rate increases. 270 Similarly,
many of the environmental costs of the program were not immediately
apparent. In particular, unanticipated long-run fisheries costs arose from
manipulating Columbia and Snake River flows to meet peak loads. 271
The financial and managerial aspects of the program were as significant
as its ratemaking and environmental consequences. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the transition to hydropower as a peaking resource required ex-
change agreements between BPA and utilities. This made federal hydro-
power a reserve for all of the region's utilities, 272 another manifestation
that the "one utility" concept was becoming the dominant regional char-
acteristic. BPA, the chief architect of this concept, was unchallenged as
regional policymaker 273 until the soaring costs of thermal plants left im-
portant regional decisions in the hands of the New York bond market. 274
Ironically, the public utilities that became so dependent on the Eastern
financial community were originally established to avoid private utility
control, which New Dealers viewed as dominated by Eastern holding
269. The seven Phase I plants included Pacific Power and Light's Jim Bridger coal plant in Rock
Springs, Wyoming; Portland General Electric's Boardman coal plant in Boardman. Oregon; Pacific
Power and Light's and Washington Water Power's Centralia coal plant in Centralia, Washington:
Portland General Electric's Trojan Nuclear Plant in Rainier, Oregon; and the first three WPPSS nu-
clear plants in Hanford, Washington. See DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix A, at 1-37 to -38. The four
nuclear plants were net billed, although BPA acquired only 30% of Trojan's output and 70% of
WPPSS No. 3. Id. at 1-39.
270. For example, in 1982 BPA proposed to raise rates an average of 27% for its industrial
customers and an average of 73% for its preference customers. I Northwest Conservation Act Re-
port, No. 8, Apr. 16, 1982, at 3.
271. In 1977, BPA admitted it did not know what the effects of increasing peaking operations
would be. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 102-03. See generally Blumm.
supra note 6.
272. See, e.g., DEIS, supra note 17, Part I, at 1-10, Appendix C, at 11-46 (describing reserves
for the region's private utilities).
273. An important BPA policy was the agency's 1971 industrial sales policy, developed as part
of the Phase I program, which limited new firm power sales to industries until BPA determined that
resources were available to serve its preference customers for a reasonable period in the future (i.e.,
eight years). See DEIS, supra note 17, Appendix C, at 11-30 to -32. Had this policy been in effect in
the 1960's, it is doubtful that BPA would have doubled its industrial sales. See supra part VA.





companies. 275 Finally, largely the brainchild of BPA and its customers,
the Phase 1 program was formulated almost wholly without public in-
volvement. Although this shortcoming did not undermine the Phase 1
program, it would prove to be the Achilles' heel of its successor.
B. Phase 2
The demise of the Phase 1 program left the region with projected en-
ergy shortages and without a plan to add resources. In 1973, in order to
avoid power shortfalls, 276 BPA terminated sales of firm power to private
utilities. 277 Deprived of access to low-cost federal hydropower, consum-
ers served by private utilities began to experience significant rate in-
creases.
278
Late in 1973, BPA and its customers agreed to a new version of the
Hydro-Thermal Power Program, quickly christened Phase 2.279 Designed
to produce at least seven additional thermal plants,280 the success of
Phase 2 depended on BPA's negotiating expertise rather than its deep
pockets. Instead of purchasing the planned output of thermal plants, BPA
would act as an agent for its preference customers, negotiating purchase
agreements for them with thermal plant developers. 281 Although this
would guarantee project sponsors markets for their power, the sponsors
retained the risks of plant delays or unsatisfactory performance, a financ-
ing arrangement resembling that employed to construct the mid-Columbia
dams during the partnership years. 282 However, BPA would exercise
some oversight over the performance of project sponsors by acting as
"trust agent" for its preference customers. 283
A critical element of the Phase 2 program was the renegotiation of
BPA's industrial customer contracts. To guard against short term power
shortages, these new contracts would establish a class of power service
275. See BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 24.
276. In the mid-1970's, BPA forecasted energy deficits every year under low water conditions.
DEIS, supra note 17, Part 1, at 11-16.
277. New nonfirm sales, however, continued. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12,
at 75.
278. Jackson, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act-Solution
for a RegionalDilemma, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 7, 12 (1980).
279. See FEIS, supra note 152, at 1-17 to -18; K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12,
at 118-19.
280. U.S. Comp. Gen., Region At the Crossroads-The Pacific Northwest Searches for New
Sources of Electric Energy, Rep. No. EMD-78-76, at 3.13 (Aug. 10, 1978). See DEIS, supra note
17, Part I, at 11-15, 11-20 (list and map of thermal plants).
281. Foote, Larsen & Maddox, supra note 7, at 845.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96. Perhaps not suprisingly, the 1970's "partner-
ship policy" came while another Republican, Don Hodel, was BPA Administrator.
283. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 175.
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referred to as "industrial firm power," allowing greater interruptibility of
industrial loads. 284 In effect, the industries would supply insurance res-
erves against power shortages due to plant delays or unforeseen load
growth. 285 In return for this lower grade power, the industrial customers
would receive credits for such interruptions 286 and would be offered new
long term contracts, extending their contractual rights into the 1990's.287
Without new contracts, the industries would almost certainly lose their
BPA power to preference customers during the shortages forecast for the
1980's.288
The federal role in the Phase 2 program, however, was not simply that
of a power broker. Installation of hydroelectric peaking generators and
construction of additional transmission lines would remain a federal re-
sponsibility. In fact, in order to decrease the financial uncertainties inher-
ent in the congressional appropriation process, BPA sought authority to
pay operation and maintenance costs out of its revenues and to finance
transmission system additions through bond sales. It received that author-
ity through the 1974 Columbia River Transmission System Act. 289 The
Act also sought to reduce the risk of power shortages during low water
years by authorizing BPA to supplement its power supply through short
term power purchases.290 Thus, Phase 2 attempted to meet short term
power shortages through a combination of industrial service interruptions
and short term power purchases.
But it was Phase 2's reliance on more thermal plants to meet long term
shortages that proved to be its undoing. Formulated without any signifi-
cant public review or assessment of environmental impacts, the pro-
284. One-fourth of the industrial loads was completely interruptible under an industrial sales
policy initiated in 1948. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67. "Industrial firm" service meant
that up to three-fourths of the industrial load could be interrupted if shortages due to plant delays or
unforeseen demands were experienced. See DEIS, supra note 17, Part I, at 11-16.
285. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 38-41.
286. Id.at41.
287. Id. at 120.
288. This did not necessarily mean that the industries would be forced to close. They could
purchase power from nonfederal sources; in fact, there was widespread concern that the industries
would seek to take advantage of the preference clause by applying to become customers of public
utilities. Eighty-five percent of BPA's industrial customers lie in or adjacent to areas served by public
utilities. See Jackson, supra note 278, at 1I.
289. Pub. L. No. 93-454, 88 Stat. 1376 (1974) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 837-838k (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)); see DEIS, supra note 17, Part I, at 11-14. Self-financing also reduced prospects for
congressional review of the Phase 2 program.
290. 16 U.S.C. § 838i(b)(6) (Supp. V 1981). However, nothing in the 1974 Act could be inter-




gram's first industrial sales contract, 291 and then the program itself,2 92
were enjoined for violating the National Environmental Policy Act. 293
Unable to participate in the expansion of the system until it completed a
comprehensive environmental impact statement on its role in the Hydro-
Thermal Power Program, in 1976 BPA notified its preference customers
that after 1983, it no longer would be able to meet their load growth.
294
The agency also informed its industrial customers that it was likely that
their contracts would not be renewed when they expired in the 1980's.295
291. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 8 Env't. Rep. Cas. 1156 (D. Or. 1975), affid, 595 F.2d 467 (9th
Cir. 1979). BPA offered its first industrial firm contract to the Alumax Pacific Corporation for a new
aluminum reduction plant in Umatilla, Oregon. I have suggested that the controversy over the Alu-
max contract is a suitable vehicle for studying the changing electric power landscape during the
1970's. Blumm, supra note 18, at 137 n.148. Professor Rodgers reminds me that the controversy
over this contract, signed in 1966 by BPA and Alumax's predecessor, Northwest Aluminum, dates to
the 1960's, when BPA incurred the wrath of then Washington Governor Daniel Evans, because the
agency failed to involve the state in the decision. The plant, originally proposed for Guemes Island in
Puget Sound was blocked largely through the efforts of Seattle attorney John Erlichman, who repre-
sented a coalition of local property owners and convinced the State Supreme Court that "executive
sessions" of the Skagit County Commissioners, during which they approved the plant, violated due
process. See W. ROrxGERS, CoRnORATE CouNmYR 167-68 (1973), citing Smith v. Skagit County, 75
Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
Stymied by Erlichman's efforts, Northwest sold its contract to American Metal Climax, later Alu-
max, which attempted to situate the plant in Warrenton, Oregon near Astoria. However, local envi-
ronmental groups filed suit, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy and Clean Air
Acts. See Foote, Larsen & Maddox, supra note 7, at 847, citing Clatsop Environmental Council v.
Hodel, Civ. No. 74-175 (D. Or. 1974). When the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
indicated that the necessary discharge permits would not be forthcoming, the proposed plant site was
relocated again, to Umatilla, Oregon, east of the Cascades. The Port of Astoria litigation ensued,
blocking deliveries of power until BPA prepared an environmental impact statement on the contract
and its relationship to BPA's Phase 2 program. While BPA was preparing this EIS, § 5(d)(1)(C) of
the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act ratified a new long term
power sales contract to Alumax if the BPA Administrator determined that he could reasonably ac-
quire sufficient resources to meet the Alumax load. 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c) (Supp. V 1981). BPA finally
completed its EIS in 1981. See BONNEVILLE PowER ADMINISTRATION, ALUMAX FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT (May, 1981). The agency's subsequent contract offer to Alumax was chal-
lenged by a coalition of environmental groups because BPA failed to make the requisite finding. That
suit was settled when it became apparent that sufficient power would be available to serve Alumax
without further commitments to thermal plants. National Wildlife Federation v. Johnson, No. 81-
7804 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 24, 1981), settlement agreement July 23, 1982 (copy on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review).
292. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 1977), aff d sub
nom. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Munro, 626 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1980). Although BPA
agreed to perform an EIS on the Hydro-Thermal Power Program as a result of the Port of Astoria
litigation, this suit was brought because the agency refused to defer programmatic activities pending
completion of the EIS. 435 F. Supp. at 595.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976) (requiring major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment to be preceded by an environmental impact statement); see also 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1500-1508 (Council on Environmental Quality's implementing regulations).
294. See Hittle, Larsen, Randall, & Michie,supra note 7, at 272-73 & n. 161 (citing letter from
Administrator Hodel to all BPA Preference Customers, June 24, 1976).
295. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 135.
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The demise of the Hydro-Thermal Program thrust the region into a
power crisis induced not only by impending power shortages, but also by
rate inequities. Consumers served by private utilities, which had been cut
off from BPA firm power in 1973,296 began to experience steep rate in-
creases due to thermal plant costs.297 In 1977 the Oregon state legislature
attempted to regain access to low cost hydropower for its private utilities
by authorizing the creation of a publicly-owned Oregon Domestic and
Rural Power Authority if rate disparities remained in 1979.298 If this au-
thority succeeded in its goal of claiming a share of preference rights for
all domestic and rural ratepayers in the state, it would immediately over-
tax BPA's resources and precipitate a region-wide civil war over federal
hydropower entitlements. 299
C. Toward a Congressional Solution
Revisions to the Bonneville Project Act were considered as early as
1975. The legislation was prompted by BPA's Notice of Insufficiency in
June of 1976, coupled with the threat posed by Oregon's Domestic and
Rural Power Authority. However, it was not until 1977 that BPA and its
customers, through the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee
(PNUCC) drafted legislation to solve the region's energy problems. Sena-
tor Jackson introduced the PNUCC bill in September of 1977,300 but nei-
ther that bill, nor a less complex successor drafted a year later, 30' man-
aged to progress very far by the time the Ninety-fifth Congress adjourned
in late 1978.302
An important change to BPA's authorities, however, did occur in
1977. As part of the Carter Administration's national energy program,
Congress established the Department of Energy and transferred BPA
from the Interior Department to the new department. 303 In doing so, Con-
296. See supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
297. For example, Portland General Electric's Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, completed in 1975,
resulted in a quadrupling of rates in Portland within three years. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS,
supra note 12, at 140.
298. OR. REV. STAT. § 262.115(1977). See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12. at
131, 165-66.
299. The City of Portland pursued an independent course of action to secure access to low-cost
hydropower for its citizens, filing suits alleging that all domestic and rural consumers should have
preference rights and that BPA's net billing contracts violated the National Environmental Policy
Act. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 172, citing City of Portland v. Hodel, Civ.
Nos. 77-928, 77-929 (D. Or. 1977).
300. S. 2080, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 28552 (1977); H.R. 9020. 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 28416 (1977).
301. S. 3418, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 13519 (1978).
302. K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 130-32.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (Supp. V 1981).
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gress subjected BPA's substantive rules to'notice and comment rulemak-
ing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 304 Until enactment of
the Department of Energy Organization Act, BPA had managed to ex-
empt most of its actions from public review and comment under the
APA. 30 5 This helps to explain why the agency found the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act so onerous: the court-ordered en-
vironmental impact statements were BPA's first experience with broad
based public participation. The inapplicability of the APA had enabled
BPA and its customers to formulate the Hydro-Thermal Power Program
without any significant contributions from the states and the public, a fact
that may have influenced the subsequent court injunctions. The Depart-
ment of Energy Organization Act prodded BPA to establish procedures
providing for public involvement in power marketing decisions, injecting
some badly needed pluralism into the agency's decisionmaking. 306
When the Ninety-sixth Congress convened in 1979, a coalition of BPA
customers was solidly behind a legislative solution to the Northwest's
power crisis. Neither BPA nor its customers wanted an administrative al-
location of limited power supplies, although BPA did propose an alloca-
tion scheme in October of 1979.307 While the Natural Resources Defense
Council asserted that a well-designed administrative allocation could spur
the region's utilities and industrial customers to undertake conservation
measures that would obviate the need for additional thermal plants, 308
BPA and its customers maintained that such an allocation would be sub-
jected to protracted litigation. 309 They alleged that Congress could avoid
304. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(1)-(3) (Supp. V 1981).
305. BPA's actions were exempted under the "public property" and "contracts" exemptions to
the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976). See also Luce & McLennan, supra note 180, at 64-68
(justifying the inapplicability of APA procedures because of BPA's need to conduct its fiscal affairs
in a businesslike manner, free from the constraints normally associated with governmental func-
tions).
306. See 46 Fed. Reg. 26,368 (1981). However, BPA does exhibit unusual interest in classifying
its actions as "interpretative rules," which do not require an opportunity for public comment, indi-
cating that the agency remains reluctant to fully involve the public in its decisions. See Luce &
McLennan, supra note 180, at 67-68.
307. See44Fed. Reg. 57,465 (1979).
308. See R. CAVANAGH, L. MoTT, J. BEEPS & T. LASH, CHOOSING AN ELECTRICAL ENERGY Fu-
TURE FOR THE PACIFIC NORTHWEsT: AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO, 232-42 (1980) (critiquing BPA's
proposal) [hereinafter cited as NRDC SCENARIO].
309. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning: Hearings on H.R. 3508 and H.R.
4159 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 311-13 (1979) (testimony of Eric Redman) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. The Ninth Circuit's decision in City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 670 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978), held that the Secretary of the Interior's power marketing
decisions only pertained to allocations of power to preference customers. It did not, as Mr. Redman
pointed out in his testimony, remove from judicial review questions such as whether Oregon's Do-
mestic and Rural Power Authority was, in fact, a preference customer.
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the uncertainties accompanying administrative allocation by devising a
legislative allocation scheme and equipping BPA with the authority to
purchase power from nonfederal sources on a long term basis. 310 Supply-
ing BPA with purchase authority was, they claimed, the key to imple-
menting any legislative allocation scheme. 311 Congress apparently
agreed. 312 The Senate passed the regional legislation on August 3, 1979,
the House passed an amended bill on November 17, 1980, which the Sen-
ate agreed to two days later. 313 On December 5, 1980, President Carter
signed the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act into law. 314
VII. LOOKING BACKWARD: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NORTHWEST POWER ACT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
No attempt will be made here to evaluate the Northwest Power Act in
comprehensive fashion. 315 Rather, this section will attempt to portray
some of the Act's significant provisions and their implementation in the
context of a half century of hydroelectric system development.
Before highlighting some of the Act's provisions, it should be noted
that the Act passed largely because it seemed to benefit all the interest
groups that lobbied for it. First, rate disparities between consumers
served by private utilities and those served by public utilities were minim-
ized by providing private utilities access to BPA lower-cost power.
316
310. Since 1974, BPA has had authority to purchase power on a short term (five years or less)
basis. See 16 U.S.C. § 838i(b)(6) (Supp. V 1981); supra note 290 and accompanying text.
311. Without purchase authority, and bound by the preference clause, Bonneville can't, as a
legal matter, sign firm power contracts with the investor-owned utilities or sign new industrial
firm power contracts with the DSIs [direct service industries). Without the ability to sign those
contracts, Bonneville can't carry out the legislated allocation.
Hearings, supra note 304, at 312 (testimony of Eric Redman).
312. See Jackson, supra note 278, at 14-22.
313. Three committees issued reports on the proposed legislation: the Senate Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 996, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); and the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). All three reports, along with floor statements, a legislative chronology, and the text of the
Act, have been compiled into one volume by BPA. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, LEGIsLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND CONSERVATION ACT
(1981). See also K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, supra note 12, at 130-81 (detailed analysis of the
evolution of the bill in the Senate).
314. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (Supp. V 1981)).
315. See, e.g., Symposium on the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. 13
ENVTL. L. Nos. 3 & 4 (forthcoming, 1983).
316. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 5(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c) (Supp. V 1981)




The costs of this increased access were paid for by increased rates
charged to industrial customers. 317 Second, in return for paying increased
rates, existing industrial customers were promised new long term con-
tracts. 318 Third, preference customers were guaranteed that their rates
would not increase more than they would have without the Act. 319
Fourth, BPA was given purchase authority to expand the system in order"
to meet the requirements of its customers, but only pursuant to a number
of provisions designed to guard against any abuses of that authority. 320 In
particular, in response to state claims of a lack of involvement in major
regional energy issues, the Act created a unique interstate planning entity,
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council,
to govern BPA's acquisition of major resources and promote conservation
and renewable resources programs through a regional energy plan. 321
Fifth, in an effort to minimize rate increases, the Act requires that all
acquisitions be "cost effective," including consideration of environmen-
tal costs, and establishes a resource priority scheme favoring conservation
and renewable resources over thermal plants. 322 Sixth, Columbia Basin
fish and wildlife damaged by the hydroelectric system are to be preserved
and restored through a basin-wide program promulgated by the Coun-
cil.323 Finally, the Act guarantees public involvement in all significant
resource decisions. 324
A. The Enlarged Mandate
The 1980 Northwest Power Act, referred to as a regional electric en-
ergy constitution by one commentator, 325 makes four significant changes
317. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 7(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(c) (Supp. V 1981).
318. Id. §§ 5(d), 5(g)(5), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839c(5)(d), 839c(g)(5).
319. See id. § 7(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(2).
320. See id. § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 839d; see generally Luce & McLennan, supra note 180, at 81-88;
Michie, supra note 180.
321. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (Supp. V 1981); Blumm &
Johnson, supra note 167, at 508-12. See also Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 10(a), 16
U.S.C. § 839g(a) (Supp. V 1981) (preserving states' ratemaking, planning, and facility siting author-
ities); id§ 10(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839g(h) (preserving state systems of water allocation).
322. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, §§ 4(e)(1), 3(4), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(e)(l), 839a(4)
(Supp. V 1981).
323. Id. § 4(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h); see Blumm & Johnson, supra note 167 at 516-39; Blumm,
supra note 18.
324. See, e.g., Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, §§ 2(3), 4(g), 16 U.S.C. §9 839(3),
839b(g) (Supp. V 1981). On the importance of public involvement, see Blumm & Johnson, supra
note 167, at 549-53.
325. E. Redman, A Brief Functional Analysis of the New Northwest Power Act I (June 1, 1981)
(memorandum presented to the Northwest Power Planning Council) (copy on file with the Washing-
ton Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Redman memo].
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to the system's basic marching orders. The Act modifies the old para-
digms of public power preference, widespread use, sound business prin-
ciples, and lowest possible rates326 with new directives of regional coop-
eration, a conservation preference, concepts of shared powers and open
processes, and an enterprise theory of liability. The changes are evident
in the purposes of the 1980 Act.
First, the Act recognizes that BPA is no longer simply a public power
promoter. In fact, the agency's role as an open advocate for public power
was short-lived; since World War II, it has preached a gospel of growth
through electric power use. 327 Electric growth required the cooperation of
private utilities, which became BPA customers during the 1950's and
which were key partners in the formulation of the Hydro-Thermal Power
Program in the 1960's.328 The Act responds to these realities: one of its
purposes is to promote cooperation among all utility systems, recognizing
the utility diversity that has characterized the region for generations. 329
Second, while the 1980 Act does not expressly repeal the "widespread
use" command, it fundamentally changes the definition of that directive
by giving priority to conservation and efficient use of electric power.330
This change is a reflection of the fact that conservation is often the
cheapest means of meeting increased demands. 331 In addition, it should
be recalled that widespread use was never a mandate to use electric en-
ergy profligately; it was basically a charge to extend electrification to ru-
ral areas that private utilities determined were uneconomical to serve. 332
Having achieved the rural electrification goal, the best means of maintain-
ing the objective of "lowest possible rates" is now through efficient use
and conservation of limited electric supplies.
The third change is also more of a redefinition than a repeal. By requir-
ing the involvement of the states, local governments, and the public in
regional electric power planning, 333 the Act implicitly recognizes that the
definition of "sound business principles" is not within the exclusive
326. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 5(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839c (Supp. V 1981) (public
preference); id. § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b) (widespread use); id. § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(t)
(sound business principles); id. § 7(a), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(e) (lowest posssible rates).
327. See supra parts IIB & I1D.
328. Private utilities began to collaborate with BPA on regional forecasts in 1946. See supra text
accompanying notes 168-70. They signed long-term BPA contracts in 1953. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 184-85. On the role of private utilities in financing thermal power plants, see supra text
accompanying notes 253-54 (Hanford) and 269-70 (Hydro-Thermal Power Program).
329. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 2(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839(5) (Supp. V 1981).
330. Id. §§ 2(l)(A), 4(e)(1), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(l)(A), 839b(e)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
331. See generally NRDC SCENARIO, supra note 308; Northwest Conservation Act Coalition, A
Model Electric Power and Conservation Plan for the Pacific Northwest (Summary) (May 5, 1982).
332. See supra part lIE.
333. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19. § 2(3). 16 U.S.C. § 839(3) (Supp. V 1981).
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province of technical experts. Instead, the Act requires that administra-
tors seek out and involve the public to ensure that "sound business princi-
ples" result from a pluralistic process and systematic consideration of di-
vergent perspectives. 334 Related to this commitment to open processes is
the concept of shared powers, which is best reflected in the establishment
of the Regional Council. In short, the Act recognizes that most of the
electric energy questions facing the region are not technical ones, but po-
litical ones. As a result, the risk of errors is to be minimized through
pluralistic administrative processes, shared powers, and the availability
of judicial review. 335
Fourth, the mandate of "lowest possible rates" 336 has been modified
considerably by the 1980 Act, particularly in its promise to ensure that all
environmental costs are paid by electric users. In fact, the Act not only
directs that future actions internalize their costs,337 it makes a significant
commitment to compensate for past losses sustained by the Columbia Ba-
sin's fish and wildlife resources at the hands of the hydroelectric sys-
tem.338 By mandating remedial fish and wildlife efforts and internaliza-
tion of future environmental costs, the Act embraces a theory of
enterprise liability of electric power planning, operations, and ratemak-
ing. Fish and wildlife and other environmental resources will no longer be
sacrificed to subsidize electric rates.
It is simply not practical to attempt to survey all the complex provisions
of the Northwest Power Act. The following sections, however, will
briefly summarize three of the principal innovations of the Act: the Re-
gional Council's fish and wildlife program, BPA's allocation of power
entitlements, and the Council's energy plan.
B. The Fish and Wildlife Program
Enterprise liability is best reflected in the Act's provisions aimed at
protecting and restoring the Columbia Basin's fish and wildlife resources,
particularly its economically valuable anadromous fish runs. Section 4(h)
directs the Regional Council to develop a comprehensive program to pre-
334. Id. § 4(g)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (BPA and the Regional Council to
maintain comprehensive public involvement programs).
335. Id. § 9(e), 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e) (authorizing judicial review of final agency actions).
336. See supra note 326.
337. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, §§ 4(e)(1), (2), 3(4), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(e)(1), (2),
839a(4) (Supp. V 1981) (cost-effective resource acquisitions to include quantifiable environmental
costs and benefits and consideration of nonquantifiable costs and benefits). See Michie, supra note
180, at 3 14.
338. See Blumm, supra note 18, at 107 n. 14 (all fish and wildlife costs attributable to the de-
velopment and operation of the hydroelectric system to be paid by ratepayers).
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serve and rehabilitate these resources to the extent their declines are at-
tributable to the development and operation of the hydroelectric sys-
tem.339 Although concern over the effects of dam building on
anadromous fish runs was evident during the New Deal, 340 the cumulative
effects of the post-war boom in dam building upon these fish runs were
little appreciated. Even less appreciated were the long term effects of the
events of 1964-the doubling of the Basin's storage capacity as a result of
the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty and the formalization of in-
tegrated system operations in the Columbia River Coordination Agree-
ment. 341 First, the increased storage capacity deprived downstream mi-
grating anadromous fish of much of the spring freshet upon which they
depended for transportation to the ocean. 342 Second, the integrated opera-
tions promoted the "one utility concept" that enabled the Hydro-Thermal
Power Program to increasingly rely on streamflows to generate power to
meet peak load demands. 343
The region's hydroelectric power was long underpriced, partly because
the fish and wildlife costs of this transformation of Columbia Basin
streamflows from fish habitat to fuel supply were not accounted for in
either system operations or in BPA's rates. 344 In effect, BPA's rates were
subsidized by fish and wildlife losses. Not coincidentally, Columbia Ba-
sin anadromous fish runs have experienced precipitous declines over the
past thirty years. 345
The 1980 Act made it clear that such losses were unacceptable and
ordered the Regional Council to develop a remedial program for BPA, the
Corps, and other federal water managers to implement. On November 15,
1982, the Council promulgated a program designed to increase spring
339. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 4(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (Supp. V 1981). A key
question, given the numerous activities contributing to the degradation of fish and wildlife habitat, is
the extent to which such degradation is attributable to the development and operation of the hydroe-
lectric system.
340. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 228-29 nn.74, 76 (describing a 1937 Report of the Commis-
sioner of Fisheries and the 1934 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c
(1976)).
341. See supra parts VB & VC.
342. See Blumm, supra note 18, at 106.
343. See A Reexamination of Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program Issues. NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW INST., 19 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, Sept. 1982, at 3.
344. No environmental impact statement on coordinated system operations has ever been per-
formed. See Operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System and the Structuring of Adminis-
trative Decisionmaking, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 10 ANADROMOUS FIsH LAW MEMO, Oct.
1980, at 7-9.
345. For example, upriver Columbia River summer chinook runs have declined 83% over the
last 23 years; spring chinook runs hit an all-time low in 1979; sockeye runs are at 38% of their 43-
year average; and summer steelhead runs are down 73% over the last 40 years. Fish and Wildlife
Program Recommendations Submitted to Regional Council, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 16 AN-
ADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, Dec. 198 1, at 4.
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flows, produce protective fish bypass operations and facilities, and under-
take fish and wildlife enhancement measures. 346 Although questions have
been raised about both the sufficiency of these measures 347 and the Coun-
cil's authority to order federal agencies to implement the measures con-
tained in the program, 348 there is little question that Congress intended the
program to change the manner in which the hydroelectic system is oper-
ated and planned. For example, it is clear that in its provision for spring
fish flows, the program amends the Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement's system operating premises. 349 Moreover, the Act's provi-
sions requiring "equitable treatment" for fish and wildlife in the Colum-
bia Basin350 and "due consideration" beyond the Columbia Basin351
make it evident that henceforth fish and wildlife considerations are to be
an important constraint on hydroelectric system expansion. For example,
minimizing fish and wildlife impacts by reducing manipulation of stream-
346. Notice of Program Approval, 47 Fed. Reg. 53, 976 (1982); see NORTHWEST POWER PLAN-
NING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1982); Northwest Power Planning
Council, Draft Program-At a Glance, I NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS No. 6, Sept.-Oct., 1982, at
4-14; A Reexamination of Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program Issues, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW INST., 19 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, Sept. 1982, at 1-13 (describing the Council's draft
program, which was very similar to the program that was promulgated); see also NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW INST., 22 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO (forthcoming, 1983) (evaluating the final
program).
347. The Columbia River Indian tribes alleged that the flows contained in the Council's water
budget were inadequate, especially on the Snake River. See 1 Northwest Conservation Act Report
No. 23, Nov. 26, 1982, at 2. The Council rejected the higher flows recommended by the tribes
because it detemined these flows were not accompanied by enough supporting information to demon-
state their superiority over its Water Budget flows. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, THE Co-
LUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 34-35 (1982).
348. BPA has suggested that the program is not binding on it despite § 4(h)(10)(A) of the North-
west Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (Supp. V 1981) (directing BPA to use its funding and
other authorities in a manner consistent with the program). See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT COLUMBIA FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, Appendix I (concluding that the
Act contains no "clear and unambiguous waiver of federal supremacy"). Note that § 4(h)(10) is not
the only consistency provision in the Act. For example, § 5(d)(3) establishes a number of conditions
which must be satisfied before BPA can increase power sales to its industrial customers after approval
of the Council's electric power plan, including a determination by the Council that such sales would
be consistent with the plan. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
349. See supra note 231. Although existing contracts like the Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement are preserved by § 10(b) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839g(b) (Supp. V
1981), § 15 of the Agreement expressly disclaims any intent to authorize operations that are inconsis-
tent with non-power functions. See Blumm, supra note 6, at 246 n. 184.
350. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 4(h)(11)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(ll)(A)(i)
(Supp. V 1981); see Blumm, supra note 18, at 152-56.
351. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 4(e)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981);
see Thatcher, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act: Fish and Wild-
life Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin, 13 ENvTL. L. 517 (1983).
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flows justifies aggressive pursuit of conservation programs and renewable
resources acquisitions even during periods of power surplus. 352
C. Allocating Power Entitlements
A driving force behind the enactment of the 1980 Act was the desire of
BPA's customers to avoid implementation of the administrative alloca-
tion scheme that BPA proposed in 1979. 353 The Act established guide-
lines for allocating power entitlements. While the Council was given au-
thority to promulgate the fish and wildlife program, the task of
implementing the allocation scheme was left to BPA. 354 This division of
responsibilities can be questioned. BPA's power sales policy has consis-
tently emphasized increased power sales to industrial customers that,
while producing increased revenues, put pressure on system planners to
expand the system and resulted in the Hydro-Thermal Power Program's
commitment to expensive thermal plants. 355 However, because the rate
impacts of this expansion were deferred, its long term costs were
masked.356
The wisdom of the Act's directive that BPA offer power sale contracts
to its customers within nine months of its enactment also can be ques-
tioned. This tight time frame made meaningful public involvement diffi-
cult. In particular, BPA determined that the nine-month period made it
impossible for it to perform an environmental impact statement, 357 a deci-
352. See infra note 371. It should be noted that hydropower is defined as a renewable resource.
Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 3(16), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(16) (Supp. V 1981). As of Novem-
ber. 1982, applications for hydroelectric power developments with a potential of 10,000 megawatts
were pending. Northwest Power Planning Council, Renewable Renaissance, I NORTHWEST ENERGY
NEWS No. 7, Nov. 1982, at 9. Development of many of these sites could adversely affect fish and
wildlife. See Thatcher, supra note 351, at 519-20 (overviewing direct and indirect adverse effects of
"'small" hydroelectric projects); id. at 527-36 (suggesting procedures and criteria to minimize ad-
verse effects on fish and wildlife).
353. See supra notes 307-14 and accompanying text.
354. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 839c (Supp. V 1981).
355. See supra part VA.
356. This is due to the fact that BPA "melds" expensive thermal power costs with cheaper
hydropower in its rates. See supra note 263; NRDC SCENARIO. supra note 308. at 228-32 (criticizing
melded rates and advocating a two-tiered rate structure that would reflect the marginal costs of new
thermal plants); see also BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, 1982 RATE PROPOSAL, FINAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-5 July, 1982) (rejecting rates based on long-run incremental costs
as inconsistent with the 1937 Bonneville Project Act's directive of "lowest possible rates consistent
with sound business principles") [hereinafter cited as BPA RATE EIS].
357. See Memorandum from BPA's Acting Environmental Manager Anthony Morrell to BPA
Administrator Peter Johnson (Sept. 3, 1981). reprinted in BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, EN-
VIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY THE FINAL POWER SALES AND RESIDENTIAL Ex-
CHANGE CONTRACTS (Sept. 1981) (justifying the failure to prepare an EIS not only on the tight time
frame, but also because it "is not possible to negotiate and prepare a contract at the same time")
[hereinafter cited as BPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT].
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sion which has been challenged in the courts. 358 BPA also agreed with the
arguments of its customers that the Act limited its ability to condition
power sales. 359 As a result, BPA deleted the long-standing provision that
gave it independent authority to reduce power deliveries where the activi-
ties of its customers impaired Columbia River fish and wildlife or the
scenic beauty of the Columbia River Gorge, 360 choosing instead to rely
on actions of other regulatory agencies. 361 BPA also resisted contract
conditions suggested by the National Marine Fisheries Service concern-
ing fish and wildlife protection and the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil concerning conservation incentives. 362
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the power sale contracts, how-
ever, concerned BPA's offer to its industrial customers. Because these
contracts gave BPA's industrial customers first priority to BPA's nonfirm
power, public power agencies claimed they violated the 1937 Act's pub-
lic preference clause that was reaffirmed in the 1980 Act.363 The Ninth
Circuit agreed and invalidated the industrial contracts in Central Lincoln
Peoples' Utility District v. Johnson, a case that will be resolved by the
Supreme Court.3 64
It may seem odd that BPA, an offspring of the public power move-
ment, would adopt a contract interpretation opposed by its preference
customers. The controversy, however, is explainable by the fact that
BPA's obligations now run much wider than simply to its preference cus-
358. Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, No. 82-3257 (9th Cir. filed May 10, 1982). This suit was
originally filed in District Court, but was dismissed by District Judge James Reddem, who ruled that
even though suits under the National Environmental Policy Act are not mentioned in § 9(e)(5) of the
Northwest Power Act, which requires a variety of suits to be brought in the Ninth Circuit within 90
days of final agency action, the case had to be filed in the Ninth Circuit. Judge Reddem's reasoning
was that if District Courts heard NEPA suits challenging actions under the Northwest Power Act, it
would "delay dispute resolution and result in an irrational bifurcated system" of review, contrary to
the intent of the Northwest Power Act. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 17 ANADROMOUS FISH
LAW MEMO, Apr. 1982, at 25 n.12 (summarizing the ruling in Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, No.
81-916 (D. Or. filed Sept. 30, 1981)).
359. See Redman memo, supra note 325, at 3 (alleging that BPA's authority to condition con-
tracts was limited to §§ 5(b), (e)).
360. Power from the Bonneville Project Power Plant shall be available only to those purchas-
ers the waste products from whose plants or operations shall not be harmful to, or destructive of,
the fish or other aquatic life of the Columbia River; nor otherwise pollute the stream; nor detract
from the scenic beauties of the Columbia River Gorge.
BPA HISTORY, supra note 20, at 286-87, quoting general terms and conditions included in all BPA
power sale contracts beginning in 1938; W. RODGERS, supra note 133, at 171-73 (noting the efforts
of BPA's industrial customers to change this provision in the early 1970's).
361. BPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 357, at 2-4 to 4-8.
362. Id. at 2-8 to 2-12.
363. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 10(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839(c)(g) (Supp. V 1981); see
BPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 357, at 12-18.
364. 673 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.), amended, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071).
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tomers. In effect, BPA becomes a regional insurer for all its customers,
meeting peak loads of both public and private utilities. 365 This insurance
is provided primarily by the interruptible nature of a portion of its indus-
trial sales. 366 Thus, allocating its nonfirm, or surplus power first to its
industrial customers was an attempt by BPA to increase regional reserves.
The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, is a reminder that BPA's regional
role is encumbered by historical baggage-the decision stands for the
proposition that regional efficiency is not to be accomplished at the ex-
pense of public preference. 367
Nevertheless, acceptance of BPA's contracts by nearly all of its cus-
tomers has augmented the concept of regionalism. 368 Private utility cus-
tomers now benefit from increasing access to BPA power through resi-
dential exchange contracts. 369 Moreover, the contracts commit BPA to
meet the firm load growth of both public and private utilities where re-
quested. 370 These additional regional responsibilities, of course, will re-
quire system expansion, and the Act authorizes long term acquisition of
generating resources by BPA. 371 A good deal of the complexity of the Act
365. See BPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 357, at 3-1 to 3-8 (discussing BPA's "com-
puted requirements" contracts).
366. Id. at 4-11.
367. In Central Lincoln, the Ninth Circuit stated that neither increased BPA revenues nor greater
regional benefits justify bypassing the preference clause. 673 F.2d at 1082-83 & n.8. In an earlier
decision, the same court ruled that even the long-run interests of existing preference customers do not
justify denying power to a preference customer in favor of a "banking" scheme with a non-prefer-
ence customer. City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1978). But see E.
Redman, supra note 94 (distinguishing the Santa Clara decision because the preference clause in-
volved there, § 9(c) of the Reclamation Act of 1939 (43 U.S.C. § 825h(c) (1976)), was not accompa-
nied by other allocative provisions).
368. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Finally, The Region Signs On, NORTHWEST EN-
ERGY NEWS No. 6, Sept.-Oct., 1982, at 3-4 (noting that 145 BPA customers signed new BPA power
sales contracts-only six preference customers and one industrial customer refused to do so).
369. See BPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 357, at 5-1 to -14.
370. Id. at 3-2.
371. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 839d (Supp. V 1981). However, the
urgency of resource acquisitions has dissipated with the sudden long term power surpluses projected
for the region. BPA now anticipates power surpluses to persist at least through the remainder of the
decade, a dramatic about-face from pre-1980 forecasts of long term power shortages. See Blumm,
supra note 17, at 148 n.197; Northwest Power Planning Council, Weighing the New Surplus. 1
NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS No. 5, Aug. 1982. The surplus has deflected attention from resource
acquisitions to power marketing initiatives, such as California power sales, that could reduce both the
surplus and pressure for BPA rate increases. It should, however, not be forgotten that past power
marketing policies have quickly turned surpluses to shortages. See supra text accompanying notes
162-65 (discussing 1940's surplus); part VA (discussing 1960's surplus); see also M. Blumm, Risk
Management and Northwest Electric Power Planning: Some Lessons From the Rearview Mirror (un-
published manuscript, to be published in 13 ENVTL. L. (1983)) (arguing, inter alia, for the preserva-
tion of the regional preference clause that requires California power sales to be conditioned on North-
west needs). A prudent resource acquisition policy would emphasize conservation measures as long
term insurance against future shortages and generating resources that can reduce conflicts between
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is attributable to a desire to place checks on this acquisition authority, 372
principally by authorizing the Regional Council to develop an electric en-
ergy plan to chart the region's energy future.
D. The Regional Energy Plan
Scheduled for promulgation in April, 1983, the Regional Electric
Power Plan will reflect all of the Act's overriding themes. 373 First, it will
be the result of open processes since it will be produced only after wide-
spread public review and comment. Second, although its forecast of the
region's electric energy needs will have considerable influence over
BPA's acquisitions, reflecting the shared powers concept, it will not dic-
tate decisions. For example, BPA may acquire major resources that are
inconsistent with the plan if it obtains congressional approval. 374 Third,
embracing the action of enterprise liability, the plan will give priority
only to "cost effective" resources, including environmental costs. 375
Fourth, among cost effective resources, the plan will favor conservation
programs. 376 Finally, the plan will contain a region-wide forecast, esti-
mating the load growth of all the region's utilities. 377
The Council forecast will clearly be the most important element of its
energy plan. Overforecasting electric demands, a regional tradition since
World War H, could justify acquisition of non-priority resources, even
those which are not "cost effective.' '378 Although the Council has indi-
cated that it will develop a range of forecasts to minimize the risk of over-
estimates, 379 there will be considerable pressure on the Council to include
hydroelectric operations and fish and wildlife measures, perhaps enabling the Regional Council to
increase fish flows to levels requested by the Columbia Basin's Indian tribes. See supra note 347.
372. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 309, at 312 (testimony of Eric Redman).
373. See supra part VIIA.
374. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 6(c)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981);
see Luce & McLennan, supra note 180, at 86.
375. See supra notes 322 & 337.
376. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 3(4)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(4)(D) (Supp. V 1981)
(10% cost advantage for conservation programs). See Michie, supra note 180, at 314-30 (detailed
evaluation of the priority scheme).
377. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Wanted: A Good Crystal Ball, I NORTHWEST EN-
ERGY NEWS No. 2, Apr. 1982, at 8.
378. Recall that the Tacoma Conference (later the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference) was
founded largely because private utilities projected no need for system expansion after World War II.
With coordinated forecasts, the region's utilities invariably predicted the need for system expansion.
See supra notes 160 & 168-70 and accompanying text.
379. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Coming to Grips with Uncertainty, 1 NoRTHWEST
ENERGY NEws No. 3, May-June 1982 at 9 (noting that the Council adopted the principles outlined in
Lee, The Path Along the Ridge: Regional Planning in the Face of Uncertainty, 58 WASH. L. REV.
317 (1983)).
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thermal plants in its high-end estimates. 380 The Act's priority scheme,
disfavoring thermal plants, should be interpreted to place a heavy burden
on the Council to justify such forecasts, particularly if they authorize sub-
sidies to resource developers in the form of feasibility studies.38' If utili-
ties believe that the Council's forecasts underestimate demands, the Act
enables them to take action to correct for such errors. 382 On the other
hand, overestimates that prompt thermal plant construction are not easily
corrected and are economically destabilizing. 383 The lessons of the past
indicate that future forecasts are more likely to assure an economical
power supply if they avoid commitments to expensive thermal plants. 384
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the region's hydroelectric system was an offspring of the
New Deal, its philosophical underpinnings can be traced to the Progres-
sive conservation movement. Progressive notions about the public nature
380. See, e.g., Northwest Power Planning Council, Coming to Grips with Uncertainty. I
NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS No. 3, May-June 1982, at 19 (PNUCC argument that the Council should
plan to meet the mid-point, not the low range, of its range of forecasts).
381. Northwest Power Act, supra note 19, § 6(f)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 838d(f)(I) (Supp. V 1981)
(authorizing the payment of feasibility and pre-construction costs to developers for resources that are
a consistent plan and meet other criteria).
382. The Act not only preserves the rights of utilities to continue to develop resources, § 2(5)(B).
16 U.S.C. § 839(5)(B), but directs BPA to grant billing credits for conservation programs and re-
source development that reduce BPA's obligation to serve their loads, § 6(h)(I). 16 U.S.C. §
839d(h)(l). This promise of payment for utility initiates should encourage utilities which disagree
with the Council's forecast to develop resources according to their own forecasts. However, unlike
resource acquisitions, the risks are on resource developers, not the region, at least until the billing
credit has been granted. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF
PROPOSED BILLING CREDIT POLICY (June, 1982); see also Michie, supra note 180, at 320-22.
383. Of course, the economic tragedy of the Washington Public Power Supply System's nuclear
plants is the best evidence of this destabilization. The five plants, originally estimated to cost $5
billion, now have a price tag of nearly $24 billion. These skyrocketing costs prompted termination of
the two plants which were not regionally insured through net billing. This, in turn, has prompted a
series of legal challenges over liability for the unrecovered costs of the plants. See Legal Scorecard, I
Northwest Conservation Act Report No. 12, June 11, 1982, at 1-2 (summarizing WPPSS litigation).
The costs of the three net billed plants have produced significant BPA wholesale rate increases, which
in turn, have dampened demand, confirming the once-disparaged theory of the price elasticity of
electricity. See BPA RATE EIS, supra note 356. Reduced demands produced electric surpluses that
induced BPA to half construction of one of the three net billed plants. See Northwest Power Planning
Council, New Troubles for WPPSS, I NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS No. 3, May-June, 1982. at 3-5.
One commentator alleges that even discounting inflation, the five WPPSS plants are more expensive
than the Panama Canal or the Great Wall of China, and about 60% of economic cost of the Vietnam
War. Mitzman, Who's Getting Rich Off WPPSS? PACIFIC NORTHWEST MAGAZINE, July-Aug., 1982,
at 40 (alleging that construction contractors, Wall Street brokers, and lawyers, have been among the
principal beneficiaries).
384. This, perhaps, is the logical conclusion of Kai Lee's analysis. See Lee. The Path Along the
Ridge: Regional Planning in the Face of Uncertainy, 58 WASH. L. REV. 317 (1983).
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of streamflows and the opportunity provided by basin-wide waterways
developments to promote social equity, prevent economic monopolies,
and preserve the rural way of life had enduring influence on New Deal
thought. The economic crisis that ushered in the New Deal provided the
impetus to marry Progressive social philosophy with large-scale federal
public works projects to stimulate economic recovery. Water projects not
only put people to work, they produced electricity which provided com-
petition to private utilities, whose excesses in the 1920's resulted in high
rates, poor service, and rural areas with no electricity. Federal power as a
"yardstick" for private utility rates and service reflected both a distrust of
private utilities, which were often controlled by large holding companies
far removed from local consumers, and a fundamental lack of faith in the
ability to control utility excesses through regulation. With the passage of
the 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act and the emergence of state
rate regulation in the post-war era, it is not surprising that the public
power movement declined.
The chief regional legacy of the New Deal was, of course, the Bonne-
ville Power Administration. The BPA was established to market whole-
sale power from federal dams and to promote public agencies as retailers
of federal power. BPA's limited charter was the product of a compromise
between New Dealers-who sought a TVA-like authority to plan and op-
erate a basin-wide federal power system-and private utility interests-
which wanted to see their allies, the Corps of Engineers, provided with
power marketing authority. Although a BPA without authority to expand
the system was viewed by public power advocates as a temporary step
along the road to a more comprehensive mandate, the subsidence of the
public power movement during and after World War II made an expanded
mandate impractical. In a very real sense, this settling of institutional ar-
rangements around a BPA without purchase authority necessitated con-
gressional intervention in 1980.
In the post-war era, the system expanded rapidly through Corps of En-
gineers planning and congressional appropriations. The rejection of the
New Deal paradigm of centralized national water planning left the shape
of the Northwest hydroelectric power in the hands of regional planners
and congressional log-rollers. While this arrangement produced more re-
gional control, it also allowed key decisions to be made in low visibility
technical reports and appropriations hearings, largely out of the public
spotlight. With Congress willing to bankroll a hydroelectric system that
surpassed the region's immediate needs, BPA employed its marketing au-
thority to maintain and expand electric consumptive industries first lured
to the region by defense contracts in World War II. Just as important, the
agency forged institutional links with the region's private utilities to coor-
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dinate demand forecasts. High forecasts induced more water projects;
more projects meant that BPA could market power to industries and pri-
vate utilities after supplying the needs of its preference customers. Cheap
federally-produced power became the engine driving regional economic
growth.
The partnership era of the 1950's solidified the role of private utilities
as an integral element of the regional power puzzle. The private utilities
gained long term BPA power contracts and took advantage of a morato-
rium on new federal project starts to secure licenses for their own hydroe-
lectric projects. Diversity of project ownership induced BPA to broadly
construe its authority to wheel nonfederal power in order to increase re-
gional efficiency. Of even greater long term significance, private and
public utilities collaborated on financing arrangements that enabled the
equity-short public utilities to construct a number of projects, most nota-
bly on the mid-Columbia. This kind of cooperative financing would be-
come a keystone of the region's approach to thermal plant construction in
the 1960's and 1970's.
The "golden age" of the 1960's witnessed maturation of the hydroe-
lectric system. Ratification of the Columbia River Treaty doubled the ba-
sin's storage capacity and promoted a series of contractual arrangments
that increased system coordination and interregional power sales. In a
classic example of achieving short term gains at the cost of long term
losses, power surpluses were dissipated by a doubling of power sales to
industrial customers. Coupled with an expansion of the planning horizon,
increased industrial power sales produced forecasts of power shortages.
With large hydroelectric sites all but exhausted, the region formulated
plans to develop thermal power plants.
The transition to an integrated hydro-thermal system proved to be a
difficult and controversial one. The initial Hydro-Thermal Power Pro-
gram foundered when rising construction costs overtaxed BPA's financ-
ing scheme and the IRS limited the tax advantages available to project
sponsors of federally-backed plants. Phase 2 of the program, financed
without federal guarantees but still with significant federal responsibility
for manipulating streamflows to meet peak power demands, was even
shorter lived. Formulated by BPA and its customers without public in-
volvement, the program was enjoined by the courts for violating NEPA,
which proved to be perhaps the most cost-effective decision of the dec-
ade. In effect, the court rulings reflected the program's lack of political
legitimacy. The considerable costs of thermal plants, both in terms of
increasing rates and their spillover costs to the environment and the re-
gion's fish runs, made it clear that decisions about expanding the electric





That consensus produced the 1980 Northwest Power Planning and
Conservation Act, with its commitments to open processes, shared
power, and enterprise liability. But while the Act's emphasis on conser-
vation, environmental quality, and fish and wildlife protection constitute
a rejection of some of the premises of the Hydro-Thermal Power Pro-
gram, it maintains longstanding principles of utility diversity, public
preference, and industrial power sales. However, none of these principles
will be quite the same in the post-Act era. For example, utility diversity
has been assured largely by what amounts to an expansion of preference
to include the residential and small farm consumers of private utilities.
The costs of this preference expansion are to be recouped through in-
creased rates paid by existing industrial customers, who agreed to in-
creased rates in return for the planning certainty that came with new long
term contracts.
More fundamentally, the Act represents a dramatic departure from the
New Deal model of broad charters to federal administrators.3 85 Through-
out the post-war era, electric policymaking was made largely by BPA and
its customers, coupled with congressional acquiescence and appropria-
tions. The detailed provisions of the 1980 statute indicate that Congress
wished to narrow considerably the agency's statutory mandates. While
there remains considerable administrative discretion, it seems clear that
this discretion will be subject to more active congressional oversight in
the future. Moreover, in creating the Regional Council and directing it to
chart the region's energy future, Congress made a significant reallocation
of power to the states. Although BPA has indicated it does not believe it
is bound by the Council's directives, it remains to be seen whether the
agency will attempt to test this interpretation. 386
Finally, in addition to greater congressional oversight and more author-
ity to the states, the Act promises public involvement in all regional
power decisions. While the public nature of streamflows has not been
seriously challeged since the Progressive conservation movement, re-
gional hydroelectric policymakers frequently sacrificed public involve-
ment in the name of administrative expertise. Unfortunately, the practical
effect of unfettered administrative discretion has been to emphasize the
short term at the expense of long term, and to emphasize the utility and
industrial customers' access to decisionmakers at the expense of the gen-
eral public. The Act's commitment to open processes is a recognition that
the region can no longer afford to make policies that are not informed by
public comment and which cannot withstand public challenges in the
385. See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE L.J. 1466, 1471-73 (1980).
386. See supra note 348.
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courts. Although public comment and judicial review have been attacked
as dilatory and inefficient, it seems clear that the benefits of ensuring
sound administrative decisionmaking far exceed the costs of delays. The
lessons of the past indicate that the long term costs of poor decisions are
simply too high for the region not to encourage active, vigorous, and crit-
ical public debate on the region's electric future.
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